Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety and the Resegregation of Public Schools by Boger, John Charles
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 78 | Number 6 Article 7
9-1-2000
Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety and
the Resegregation of Public Schools
John Charles Boger
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John C. Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety and the Resegregation of Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1719 (2000).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol78/iss6/7
WILLFUL COLORBLINDNESS: THE NEW
RACIAL PIETY AND THE RESEGREGATION
OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS
JOHN CHARLES BOGER*
Some have argued for an unqualified extension of
"colorblindness" to every legal setting. Three recent decisions
within the Fourth Circuit appear to have accepted this absolutist
position, forbidding public school boards from any consideration
of race or ethnicity in making future student assignments to public
schools-unless the boards are acting remedially to comply with
judicial desegregation decrees. This Article examines the
constitutional authority for these novel holdings. It concludes that
the Fourth Circuit's new and inflexible extension of "colorblind"
jurisprudence to the public school context is not warranted-either
by the Supreme Court's specific holdings or by its belief in the
necessity for strict judicial scrutiny of all racial classifications. To
the contrary, the Article suggests that the Court has previously
intimated that diversity in educational settings is one goal
sufficiently compelling to survive strict judicial scrutiny, and that
race-conscious student assignments should constitute acceptable
means toward that end, at least in those schools where admission is
not merit-based.
The Article observes that because of the continued national pattern
of residential segregation by race, the Fourth Circuit's decisions
invite a new era of de facto school segregation-a development
that would be deeply injurious to the long-term interests of a
nation presently growing more racially and ethnically diverse. The
Article examines several possible responses that might be available
to public school boards wishing to minimize the educational and
social damage inflicted by the Fourth Circuit's decisions.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A., 1968, Duke
University; M.Div., 1971, Yale Divinity School; J.D., 1974, University of North Carolina. I
am grateful to Edward Lewis, Joel Bondurant, Eric Brignac, Deidra Grant, and Steven
McCloskey for their wonderful research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
In the closing months of the twentieth century, federal courts
within the Fourth Circuit rendered three decisions that could
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mandate greater social change in public schools than any judicial
actions taken in the past thirty years. Two of the three decisions
emerged from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit itself-Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board1 and
Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools2-while a federal
district court in Charlotte, North Carolina rendered the third-
Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools? For different
reasons, each of these cases forbids school boards from using race or
ethnicity as a factor in assigning students to public elementary and
secondary schools, even when these elected school officials deeply
believe, based upon sound social scientific evidence, that a racially
diverse student body is educationally useful and socially desirable.
These three decisions call into question hundreds of public
student assignment plans, most of which have been crafted carefully
over the past thirty years by school boards and superintendents, with
the input of thousands of interested parents and teachers, under the
authority of leading Supreme Court decisions, federal executive
guidelines, and state directives. In the wake of Tuttle, Eisenberg, and
Capacchione, this entire body of legal precedents and multilateral
agreements stands at risk.4
1. 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).
2. 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000).
3. 57 F. Supp. 2d 228 (W.D.N.C. 1999); see also Capacchione v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Sch., 190 F.R.D. 170, 172 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (noting that separate notices of
appeal were filed by a class of minority school children on October 7, 1999 and by the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board on October 8, 1999). Although the case was known
as Capacchione throughout the proceedings in the district court, the lead party on appeal
has changed, and the case is now known as Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education. See, e.g., Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 211 F.3d 853 (4th Cir.
2000); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants (Corrected), Belk (4th Cir. filed Feb. 1, 2000) (Nos.
99-2389, 99-2391).
4. Although District Judge Potter refused to stay the imposition of his
comprehensive order in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg case for even one school year pending
appeal, until the inception of the 2001-2002 academic year, see Capacchione, 190 F.R.D. at
175, a panel of the Fourth Circuit later granted a stay pending appeal. See Belk v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 99-2389(L), 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34574, at *8
(4th Cir. Dec. 30,1999).
An unusual public debate subsequently broke out among judges of the Fourth
Circuit over whether to allow the circuit panel to hear the appeal in the normal course, or
whether to bypass panel consideration and hear the case initially en banc. See Belk, 211
F.3d at 854-56 (2000) (declining to hear the case initially en banc). Chief Judge Wilkerson
wrote an opinion concurring in the denial, expressing "a commitment to the orderly and
customary procedure of the court." Id at 854 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring in the denial of
an initial hearing en banc). In a strong dissent, Judge Luttig contended that the panel's
grant of a stay pending appeal seemed predicated, at least in part, on its view that the
school board and the minority plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits of their
appeals, see id. at 857 (Luttig, J., dissenting from denial of hearing en banc), which would
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The handiwork of these courts reflects a new form of racial piety,
a dubious offshoot (call it a heresy) from the orthodoxy fashioned by
the Supreme Court during its twenty-five-year struggle with
affirmative action policies. The emerging heresy is characterized by
an implicit claim to moral innocence and an unreflective formal
devotion to "colorblind justice" in every setting. In the limited
context in which the Supreme Court's orthodoxy first arose-the
distribution of scarce public resources-its originators believed
themselves to have charted a difficult but needed path across the
nation's perpetual racial divide. Colorblind justice, the Supreme
Court insists, is the fairest way to mediate certain widely shared
public values that clash sharply when victims of racial subordination
seek legal preferences in redress for America's undeniable history of
racial and ethnic injustice. How better to reconcile clashing values,
including (1) claims of equity versus our national commitment to
merit and excellence, (2) the sense of group injury versus our
commitment to individual rights, and (3) the sins of the past versus
our collective aspirations for the future, than by beginning, without
further delay, to treat everyone as if race were irrelevant?
The Supreme Court's present embrace of this view, led by Justice
O'Connor, demands a deep "skepticism"5 of all racial classifications, a
skepticism that manifests itself through insistence upon "strict judicial
scrutiny" of any state or federal actions that purport to classify people
by race or ethnicity. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have
applied this skeptical orthodoxy to a discrete range of problems-
principally disputes over public contracting,6 public employment,7
competitive admission to graduate and professional schools, s and the
redistricting of state and federal voting districts--almost all of which
involved racially diverse competitors for limited public favors or
render later en banc consideration of that decision probable, with attendant and
undesirable delay in implementing Judge Potter's injunction. See id. at 858-60 (Luttig, J.,
dissenting from denial of hearing en banc).
5. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,223 (1995).
6. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1989) (awarding
of municipal construction contracts); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204 (awarding of federal
construction contracts).
7. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 153 (1987) (hiring of state troopers);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 269-70 (1986) (layoffs of public school
teachers).
8. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978) (admission to
medical school); see also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (admission to
law school).
9. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 901-02 (1998); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
903-05 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,633 (1993).
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rewards. In its application of skeptical strict scrutiny principles to
these problems, however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
cautioned against too categorical or unsparing an application of its
colorblind approach, stressing that strict judicial scrutiny does not
invariably forbid state actors to abandon all considerations of race. 0
Nonetheless, a number of legal scholars," public advocates,12 and
10. See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975) ("[T]he
exclusion on racial grounds ... offends the Constitution and not the particular skin color
of the person excluded. The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the
lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at least a generation:
discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong
and destructive of democratic society ... ."); TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE 201 (1996) ("The best protection for
every individual ... is to be found in law that does not give effect to any racial views
.... "); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACrION at ix (1996) ("The thesis of this book is that affirmative action, a well intentioned
but flawed instrument of public policy ... should be revamped so that preferences.. . are
provided on the basis of class, not race or gender."); Glenn C. Loury, Performing Without
a Net, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 49, 59 (George E. Curry ed., 1996) ("I am
also convinced that racial preferences in hiring, educational opportunities and contracting
do not provide a solution for this problem."); Charles Murray, Affirmative Racism, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 1984, reprinted in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACE,
GENDER, ETHNICITY AND THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION 191 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994) ("I
was ... arguing that preferential treatment of blacks was immoral."); Richard Posner, The
DeFunis Case: The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974
Sup. CT. REv. 1, 25 (1974) ("I contend, in short, that the proper constitutional principle is
not 'invidious' racial or ethnic discrimination, but no use of racial or ethnic criteria to
determine the distribution of government benefits and burdens."); Antonin Scalia, The
Disease As Cure: "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race," 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 156 (1979) ("I am ... opposed to racial affirmative action for such
reasons of both principle and practicality."); William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race,
the Supreme Court and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979) ("We shall not
now see racism disappear by employing its own ways of classifying people and of
measuring their rights. Rather one gets beyond racism ... by a complete, resolute and
credible commitment never to tolerate in one's own life--or in the life or practices of one's
government-the differential treatment of other human beings by race.") (emphasis in
original).
12. Among the legal groups to target all use of race or ethnicity by public educational
institutions are the Center for Individual Rights (CIR) and the Institute for Justice. The
CIR has crafted a litigation campaign to challenge any use of race. See Center for
Individual Rights, Civil Rights Principles and Objectives (visited Sept. 1, 2000)
<http://www.cir-usa.orgtcr-aa.htm> (proclaiming its legal advocacy in opposition to racial
preferences in student admissions). See generally Beachhead for Conservatism, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 27, 1999, at All (naming the CIR as "runners-up" for lawyers of the year and
explaining that while "[s]everal conservative groups are fighting similar battles-the
Institute for Justice and the Washington Legal Foundation, among others- ... CIR has
been especially effective, carefully selecting both its battles and the circuits they fight
them in, with an eye to victory").
The Institute for Justice, which describes itself alternatively as "our nation's only
libertarian public interest law firm," Institute of Justice, Profile (visited Aug. 3, 2000)
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lawyers 13 have dismissed the Court's cautionary warnings and worked
with zeal and some success to secure unqualified legislative and
judicial commitment to colorblindness as an unvarying rule. 14
Whatever the wisdom of the Court's original choice (and it has been
widely questioned),15 the present expansion, represented most
<http://www.ij.orglprofile/index.html>, and as a "merry band of litigators," John E.
Kramer, J's Merry Band of Litigators (visited Sept. 1, 2000) <http://www.ij.org/
merry.bandlindex.html>, identifies opposition to racial preferences as one of six legal
areas of focus. Its work to date seems directed more toward the active support of citizen
initiatives or referenda, in states such as California and Washington, to ban all race-
conscious governmental actions, than toward participation in litigation. See Institute for
Justice, Legal Cases (visited Sept. 1, 2000) <http://ww.ij.orglcases/index.html>.
13. A number of skillful attorneys have appeared in many of the recent spate of
lawsuits challenging the use of racial considerations by school districts and state
institutions of higher education. For example, A. Lee Parks has served as counsel in the
following cases in addition to Capacchione (when he represented the white intervenor
parents): United States v. Georgia, 171 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 1999) (arguing that the Troup
County School District had achieved unitary status); Tracy v. Board of Regents, 59 F.
Supp. 2d 1314 (S.D. Ga. 1999), vacated, 208 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(challenging the University of Georgia's affirmative action admission policies and alleging
that white applicants were discriminated against based on their race); Wooden v. Board of
Regents, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Ga. 1999) (challenging the University's affirmative
action admission policies and the policies affecting historically black institutions). Mr.
Parks also has served as counsel in cases representing white voters who challenged alleged
racial gerrymandering. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900 (1995); Clark v. Putnam County, 168 F.3d 458 (11th Cir. 1999).
14. Compare Brewer v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir.
2000) (vacating a district court injunction that had forbidden a school board's use of race-
conscious assignment policies as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and remanding
for a full trial on whether the goal of reducing racial isolation constitutes a sufficiently
compelling interest under Second Circuit precedent to justify race-conscious assignments
to public schools), Hunter v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999)
(upholding race-conscious selection of elementary students for admission to university-
based, research-oriented public school), and San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco
Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (tentatively approving a
settlement that allows consideration of race and/or ethnicity as one factor in a student
assignment program), with Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 808 (1st Cir. 1998)
(invalidating race-conscious admissions to a public school that admitted most students
based on competitive examinations); Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F.
Supp. 2d 358,382 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (dissolving the 25-year-old school desegregation decree
in the Jefferson County school case and enjoining further use of race-conscious admissions
criteria for a special magnet high school that operated to exclude African-American
students from those programs).
15. Scholars who have criticized Croson include the following: Alexander Aleinikoff,
A Case For Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060, 1104 (1991) (faulting Croson's
majority opinion on four factors); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-
Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 50 (1991) (arguing that affirmative action programs such as
the city of Richmond's do not merit heightened scrutiny); Michael Rosenfeld, Decoding
Richmond. Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutionality, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 1729, 1791 (1989) ("From the standpoint of the constitutionalization of formal
means-regarding equality of opportunity, Justice O'Connor's overly narrow compensatory
approach in Croson-and, for that matter, Justice Scalia's-is even more fundamentally
[Vol. 781724
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prominently by Tuttle, Eisenberg, and Capacchione, rests on little
better than an unexamined legal faith.
In this Article, I carefully analyze these three decisions and
briefly assess their implications for other school districts throughout
the Fourth Circuit. I suggest that Tuttle, Eisenberg, and Capacchione
are poorly reasoned, legally unsound, and constitutionally misguided
exercises in judicial craft. Indeed, they flirt with judicial
'insubordination, dismissing without serious consideration, without
even the courtesy of a distinguishing explanation, a constitutional
consensus first articulated by a unanimous Supreme Court in 1971,16
one since embraced by at least six Justices,' and most importantly,
flawed."); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REv. 381, 396 (1989)
("O'Connor's opinion splinters the court, is hard to follow, and is unclear as to her holding
on the question of affirmative action."); David Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public
Interest, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 12 (1996) ("[T]he general notion of consistency used in
Adarand and Croson would lead to implausible, even bizarre conclusions."); Note,
Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 218 (1989) (noting that "the Court's language
reflects assumptions about the purpose of the equal protection clause and the nature of
racism that stem from a formally appealing but substantively flawed conception of an
already color-blind society"). Similarly, scholars who later criticized Adarand include the
following: Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1784 (1996) (criticizing
the Supreme Court's narrow tailoring approach in Adarand and Croson on two grounds,
and suggesting instead that race can be a compelling interest which does not need to
satisfy the narrow tailoring test); Neil Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the
Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 673, 677 (1996) ("Adarand's mixed message makes it a rather slippery precedent.
Moreover, because the Court remanded the case rather than resolving the dispute,
Adarand offers little guidance about the application of strict scrutiny review."); Elaine
Jones, Race and the Supreme Court's 1994-1995 Term, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
DEBATE, supra note 11, at 146, 151 ("The troubling aspect about Adarand is the
enormous effort that will now have to be spent litigating these cases ... gathering the data
to confirm what Congress already knew from its own experience."); and Neal Devins, The
Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1986 (1999) (reviewing CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1999) ("But, by saying so little, Adarand leaves it to lawmakers to spin the decision to fit
their needs. Inside the Washington, D.C. beltway, where affirmative action is entrenched,
Adarand is of little consequence, if any at all.")); Note, Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV.
111, 156-57 (1995) ("The Adarand majority's bare mention of Section 5 highlights the fact
that the Court was unable to rebut cogently the argument that the text of Section 5 allows
for both 'incongruence' and 'inconsistency.' ").
16. See Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)
(observing that a school board decision that "each school should have a prescribed ratio of
Negro to white students ... as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary
powers of school authorities").
17. The six Justices who recognize the constitutionality of race-conscious state action
for educational diversity, broadcasting diversity, and other non-remedial purposes include
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978) ("Davis' articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past
societal discrimination is, under our cases, sufficiently important to justify the use of race-
conscious admission programs where there is a sound basis for concluding that minority
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one that has been relied and acted upon, with ample justification, by
school officials at national, state, and local levels.
Beyond their intellectual harm, I suggest that these decisions
threaten disastrous real-world consequences for millions of students
throughout the Fourth Circuit. Despite their formal commitment to
racial fairness, these cases will, unless modified, almost certainly
operate with breathless efficiency and disturbing speed to impel
widespread racial resegregation, to promote racial and socioeconomic
isolation, and, consequently, to perpetuate racial subordination.
The crucial link between this new piety of colorblindness and
those dire educational and social consequences lies in residential
segregation, a social reality which even the colorblind can surely see.
Although some school boards may turn to creative alternatives,18 if
race or ethnicity no longer can be taken into account, then most
boards will experience strong political and social pressures to return
to neighborhood schools, that is, to assign students based upon their
neighborhood of residence. And throughout the Fourth Circuit, as in
the nation at large, most of those neighborhoods are currently, and
underrepresentation is substantial and chronic ... ."), Justice Powell, see id. at 311 ("This
[referring to the attainment of a diverse student body] clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal."), and Justice Stevens, who joined in the majority opinion in Metro
Broadcasting along with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. See Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601-02 (1990) ("The public interest in
broadcasting diversity-like the interest in an integrated police force, diversity in the
composition of school faculty, or diversity in the student body of a professional school-is
in my view unquestionably legitimate."), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474
(1982) (Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, agreeing that "in the
absence of a constitutional violation, the desirability and efficacy of [voluntary] school
desegregation are matters to be resolved through the political process"). Then-Justice
Rehnquist formerly acknowledged a state's authority to employ race-conscious policies in
making student school and busing assignments. See Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 439
U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978) ("While I have the gravest doubts that the Supreme Court of
California was required by the United States Constitution to take the action that it has
taken in this case, I have very little doubt that it was permitted by the Constitution to take
such action [referring to assigning and busing children on a race-conscious basis].").
18. See infra Part IV; see also Elizabeth Jean Bower, Note, Answering the Call: Wake
County's Commitment to Diversity in Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 2026, 2036-38 (2000)
(providing a careful examination of Wake County, North Carolina's new student
assignment policy). The Wake County School Board has responded to the Tuttle and
Eisenberg decisions by abandoning race and ethnicity in favor of socioeconomic status and
student achievement as relevant factors in making students assignments to its schools. See
Todd Silberman, School Plan Adopted, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 11,
2000, at 1A (describing the Wake County plan, which relies on both student test scores
and parental income levels to assign school children to Wake County schools); see also
Ben Wildavsky, A Question of Black and White, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 10,
2000, at 26,26-27 (noting the Wake County plan uses socioeconomic factors and academic
achievement in lieu of race).
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long have been, segregated by race and to a lesser extent by
socioeconomic class.19
Nor is the underlying explanation for these housing patterns
mysterious. White citizens have for more than a century enforced
housing segregation by race-in my grandfather's time, through
statutes,2 social customs, and extra-legal methods such as
intimidation, arson, bombing, or lynching2 -- and in more recent
decades, through a remarkable combination of hostile or indifferent
federal and state governmental policies augmented by massive private
marketplace discrimination.' To be sure, both private housing
19. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 61-88 & tbls.3.1,
3.3 & 3.4 (1993) (describing and documenting the persistence of residential segregation
and "hypersegregation" in major metropolitan areas in every geographical region of the
United States in 1970 and 1980); REYNOLDS FARLEY & WILLIAM H. FREY, LATINO,
ASIAN, AND BLACK SEGREGATION IN MUTLI-ETHNIC METOR AREAS: FINDINGS FROM
THE 1990 CENSUS, POPULATING STUDIES CENTER RESEARCH REPORT NO. 93-278 (Ann
Arbor: Univ. of Mich. 1994) (documenting a slight overall decline in average residential
segregation from 1980 to 1990, measured by the widely-used "dissimilarity index," from
78.8 to 74.5); see also Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION 291, 291-300 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996) [hereinafter
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION] (examining the close relationship between housing
segregation and the educational isolation of minority students, as well as federal judicial
reluctance to acknowledge either this relationship or the history of extensive
governmental complicity in the perpetuation of segregated housing); John Yinger,
Housing Discrimination is Still Worth Worrying About, 9 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 893,
910-11 (1998) (noting that the declines reported by Farley and others after the 1990 census
are "modest," and insisting that "[t]he degree of [residential] segregation between blacks
and whites, by any measure, remains far above the degree observed between any other
two large groups," which rarely exceed 30 on the dissimilarity index among any European
ethnic group).
20. See generally CHARLES MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 138-
62 (1940) (exhaustively documenting the "segregation ordinances," statutes, and other
legal devices that were regularly used to enforce residential segregation). Mangum
explains that "[s]outhern white people [were] averse to living in close proximity to
Negroes unless the latter [were] their servants." Id. at 138. He further notes that there
was "a tacit understanding in the South that no Negroes [were] permitted to own property
or reside in white districts" and adds that "segregation ordinances," restrictive covenants,
and other legal devices were developed since "whites desire[d] a more certain way of
accomplishing their purpose." Id. at 147.
21. See generally 2 GUNNER MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 622-27 (Pantheon Books 1962) (1944) (describing
extra-legal methods used to maintain residential segregation, including bombing);
ELLIOTT RUDWICK, RACE RIOT AT EAST ST. LOUIS JULY 2, 1917 (1964) (offering a
detailed account of violent white resistance in response to African-American migration
into one urban center); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS 100-02, 118-19 (Bantom Books 1968) (recounting the use of violence by
whites resisting residential integration).
22. See generally CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF
2000] 1727
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choices and economics also play a role in current housing patterns,23
but the best evidence remains that racial prejudice and active
discrimination by whites have forced residential segregation upon
many African-Americans, and to a lesser extent on Latinos and Asian
Americans as well.
Federal courts that would forbid school boards from considering
race in school assignments cannot plausibly claim to be unaware of
these all-but-inevitable social consequences that will follow in the,
wake of their unorthodox decisions. Nor, as I argue below, can they
claim that their decisions are required by either Supreme Court
precedent or the underlying constitutional concerns that motivated
those prior cases.24 Therefore, the courts must take full responsibility
for commanding school boards to abandon what, with all their
difficulties and disappointments, have been the most effective means
for knitting together our increasingly heterogeneous society-racially
and ethnically diverse public schools.25 Their judicial handiwork
DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993) (evaluating
careful studies of 25 metropolitan areas, commissioned by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development and carried out in 1989, that found "[o]n average,
blacks encountered unfavorable treatment 46 percent of the time when renting a home
and 50 percent of the time when trying to purchase one"); MASSEY & DENTON, supra
note 19, at 17-59 (chronicling policies by the Federal Housing Administration, the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation, the Veterans Administration, the Federal Highway
Administration, and other federal and state agencies that deliberately have created and
perpetuated segregated neighborhoods since 1900); CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS
ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES
(1959) (exploring the widespread use of restrictive real estate covenants as a method of
excluding African-Americans and other minorities from "white" neighborhoods); J.
HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE, THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 140-45, 223-28, 238-42 (1979) (examining the causes of
housing segregation, including decades of discrimination by federal and local
governmental agencies and by private organizations, and explaining the inevitable
relationship between housing policies and school composition); James A. Kushner,
Apartheid in America: An Historical and Legal Analysis of Contemporary Racial
Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 How. L.J. 547 (1979) (documenting the
legal and social forces that combined to segregate many of the nation's residential
neighborhoods).
23. Ongoing research has documented, however, that a majority of African-
Americans would prefer to live in racially integrated neighborhoods if they could avoid
violence or neighborhood hostility. See John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential
Segregation, in RACE, POVERTY, AND AMERICAN CITIES 389, 391 & n.14 (John Charles
Boger & Judith Welch Wegner eds., 1996) (noting four such studies).
24. See infra notes 163-222 and accompanying text.
25. See generally Charles T. Clotfelter, Public School Segregation in Metropolitan
Areas, 75 LAND ECON. 487, 487 (1999) (observing that "school desegregation is arguably
the most important policy of American government to encourage racial integration");
Gary Orfield, Unexpected Costs and Uncertain Gains of Dismantling Desegregation, in
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 19, at 73 (reviewing both the positive
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opens a disturbing and reactionary chapter in the long history of
American judicial involvement with issues of race and social justice.
This Article has four parts. In Part I, I will briefly review the
historical role that race has played in public school assignment
policies. In order fully to appreciate the three recent decisions in
Tuttle, Eisenberg, and Capacchione and the educational changes they
initiate, we must weigh the extent to which they move public schools
backward, toward the era of racial separation. My brief historical
account reviews three prior eras in Southern school desegregation
and suggests that we now appear to be moving into a new and
malignant fourth era.26
The first era comprises the long generations stretching backward
from 1954, during which many states by law or constitutional
provision, and many more by practice, deliberately segregated their
schools to separate and isolate African-American children (and to a
lesser extent Asian Americans) from the white majority. The second
era lasted fewer than two generations, from 1954 through the late
1980s, when federal courts authored constitutional precedents (and
federal executive and legislative authorities promulgated affirmative
policies) designed to end the widespread regime of mandatory, legally
enforced school segregation. Although many school districts moved
with glacial slowness until 1968, eventually thousands of districts
experienced meaningful racial desegregation for the first time in their
history, The third era began in the late 1980s, when lower federal
courts and eventually the Supreme Court began to elaborate a law of
"unitary status," clarifying the circumstances under which school
districts could free themselves of federal judicial -supervision and
return to local control of student assignment and other policies.
In Part II, the discussion turns from the past to the present, first
taking up Capacchione, the recent federal district court decision
addressing the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system. The district
court's decision actually resolves two originally separate cases that
were consolidated for trial in 1998. The first is the thirty-five year-old
benefits of school integration and the unrecognized costs of resegregation); William L.
Taylor, The Continuing Struggle for Equal Educational Opportunity, in RACE, POVERTY,
AND AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 23, at 463, 463-70 (reviewing evidence on the positive
educational benefits of desegregation).
26. Of course, any attempt to divide the seamless web of the past into discrete eras
invites distortions. In his comprehensive book on school desegregation from 1954 through
1970, then-Professor J. Harvie Wilkinson plausibly identified "four successive stages"
measured by the degree of Southern compliance and effective desegregation: absolute
defiance (1955-1959), token compliance (1959-1964), modest integration (1964-1968), and
massive integration (1968-1972). WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 78.
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school desegregation case long known as Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education.2 7 (For purposes of clarity, I will
refer to that case, in its present iteration, as Swann '99, to a second
case, brought by an aggrieved white parent in 1997, as Capacchione
'97, and to the joint opinion eventually rendered after the two cases
were consolidated by the district court for trial, as Capacchione '99.)
In resolving Swann '99, the district court held that the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg school district, which since 1965 had operated under a
federal desegregation decree, had finally become "unitary," requiring
the termination of federal judicial supervision.28 Although the
"unitary status" holding in Swann '99 is not free from doubt and has
been strongly contested by the plaintiffs, 9 its significance for school
districts beyond the boundaries of Mecklenburg County is far less
than the potential impact of Capacchione's second principal holding.
That second holding, responsive to the Capacchione '97 lawsuit,
declared that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board, although
ostensibly "free from federal control" following the court's finding of
unitary status, is actually not free to use its own best educational
judgment in making student assignments. Instead, the district court
enjoined the Charlotte-Mecklenburg board from using racial criteria
in making student assignments, even if the school board believes such
a course is necessary and desirable to promote racially and ethnically
heterogeneous public schools.30 I will carefully examine the body of
Supreme Court precedent that appears contrary to the district court's
holding as well as the handful of precedents upon which the district
court itself relied. Moreover, I will assess whether the factors that
have concerned the Supreme Court as it weighs race-conscious state
classifications in other contexts should have equal weight when a
school board considers race in assigning students to schools to further
an educational interest in diversity.
The future of Capacchione '99 as a whole might seem more
27. 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C. 1965), affd, 369 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1966).
28. Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 232 (W.D.N.C.
1999).
29. See Brief of Appellants Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. at 13-16, Belk v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. (4th Cir. 2000) (Nos. 99-2389, 99-2391, 00-1098)
(contending that the district court made clearly erroneous factual determinations in
concluding that the Charlotte district is unitary); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants (Corrected)
at 19-48, Belk (4th Cir. filed Feb. 1, 2000) (Nos. 99-2389, 99-2391) (faulting the district
court's factual and applied findings on numerous grounds).
30. For a perceptive analysis of Capacchione '99 from one of the attorneys
representing the original Swann plaintiffs, see Luke Largess, Public School Resegregation
in Charlotte, TRIAL BRIEFS (North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, Inc., Raleigh,
N.C.), Nov. 1999, at 4.
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uncertain on appeal had not separate panels of the Fourth Circuit
rendered two decisions in the fall of 1999-Tuttle and Eisenberg-
both of which reached conclusions about the permissible role of race
in student assignment policies that are similar to those in Capacchione
'99 (albeit for different constitutional reasons). In Part III, I review
these two complementary Fourth Circuit decisions and subject their
rationale to careful analysis. I suggest that these cases ignore the
most direct and pertinent body of Supreme Court jurisprudence,
drawing dubious support from precedents that were fashioned in
different legal and factual contexts.' In Part IV, I address the
concerns of those pragmatists who care less about whether these
decisions were rightly or wrongly decided and more about what they
might require of future school boards within the Fourth Circuit.
I. THE USE OF RACE IN MAKING STUDENT ASSIGNMENTS: THE
GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARDS
A. The Historical Background
For most of the nation's history, statutes unapologetically
enforced racial separation in the public schools. Indeed, most
Southern states criminalized attempts to teach basic reading or
writing skills to African slaves.32 Even during the Reconstruction
period, when state-supported public schooling was inaugurated for
both white and black children throughout the South, students were
segregated by race into separate public schools because of widespread
white racial bigotry.3 Later, the Supreme Court expressly approved
31. See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions Programs
in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1999) (providing
general background and commentary on these issues).
32. See, e.g., JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH,
1860-1935, at 2 (1988) ("Between 1800 and 1835, most of the Southern states enacted
legislation making it a crime to teach enslaved children to read or write."); JOHN HOPE
FRANKLIN, THE FREE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1790-1860, at 168 & n.22 (Norton
Library 1971) (1943) (noting that North Carolina passed legislation in 1831 and 1832
forbidding the education of slaves).
33. Although North Carolina's Constitution of 1868, adopted during the
Reconstruction period, did not formally refer to segregated schooling, even the most
zealous supporters of social change at the time "recognized the depth of racial prejudice
and agreed that [North Carolina's newly supported statewide public] classrooms would be
segregated." PAUL D. ESCOTT, MANY EXCELLENT PEOPLE: POWER AND PRIVILEGE IN
NORTH CAROLINA, 1850-1900, at 144 (1985). North Carolina and other Southern states
eventually adopted either state constitutional provisions, statutes, or both, making racial
segregation mandatory. See MANGUM, supra note 20, at 78-79 & n.10 (citing N.C. CONST.
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systems of racially segregated, unequally funded public schooling in
two important cases that followed Plessy v. Ferguson:' Cumming v.
Richmond County Board of Education35 in 1899 and Gong Lum v.
Rice 36 in 1927.
The effort to overturn this system of racially segregated public
schooling required a courageous and dedicated seventy-year legal
struggle. It began with targeted efforts by the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People, under the leadership of
Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall, to desegregate
graduate and professional schools in the 1930s and 1940s.37 That
campaign broadened in the 1950s and 1960s into a direct assault on
the whole system of state-segregated public elementary and
secondary schooling-a system mandated by the statutes of Southern
states and observed with no less scrupulous adherence by the
segregative practices and customs of many hundreds of other school
districts throughout the nation.
The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in 1954 in Brown v.
Board of Education8 condemned state-enforced segregation in public
education under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
art. IX, § 2; N.C. CODE ANN. § 5384 (Michie 1931)). But segregation was not confined to
the South; segregated public schools were common throughout the North and West both
prior to and following the Civil War. See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE
NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860, at 113-52 (1961); MANGUM, supra note 20, at
79-83. For example, even in Massachusetts, perhaps the northern state most celebrated
for its racial tolerance, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld racially
segregated public schools in 1849 in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) 198, 209-
10 (1849). The Massachusetts legislature eventually enacted a statute in 1855 that
prohibited racial or religious distinctions in admitting students to Massachusetts's schools.
See LrITWACK, supra, at 148-49.
34. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
35. 175 U.S. 528,545 (1899) (permitting the Richmond County, Georgia School Board
to continue providing tax support for a whites-only high school while simultaneously
withdrawing financial support for the district's separate, blacks-only high school).
36. 275 U.S. 78, 87 (1927) (rejecting an Equal Protection Clause claim brought by
Asian American parents whose child was refused admittance to Mississippi's public
schools for white children and was assigned to "colored" schools).
37. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976)
(describing the NAACP's campaign); GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES
HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983) (exploring Charles
Houston's role in developing the legal strategy that led to Brown); MARK TUSHNET,
MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,
1936-1961, at 116-86 (1994) (recounting Marshall's role as a legal strategist, oral advocate,
and courtroom lawyer in the school desegregation campaign).
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown v. Board of Educ. ("Brown II"), 349 U.S. 294,
300-01 (1955) (addressing the remedial responsibilities of the parties and the proper role
of the lower federal courts).
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Amendment. 9 The opinion rested on Chief Justice Warren's central
insight that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal."'  Because that basic proposition was fiercely resisted in
many quarters,41 actual desegregation of public schooling lagged
woefully behind Brown in the formerly de jure states. Indeed, in
1964, only 2.25% of all African-American school children in the
South attended desegregated schools.4 Not until Congress adopted
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196443 and began threatening to
withhold millions of federal dollars from still-segregated school
districts did resistance to desegregation begin to abate.'
B. The Remedial Consideration of Race Under Green and Swam
By far the most effective and significant post-Brown judicial
decisions were rendered in Green v. County School Board45 in 1968
and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education46 in 1971.
Green and Swann together set the parameters for all subsequent
desegregation orders, clarifying the scope of school board duty, the
limits of federal judicial authority, and the goals and objectives
appropriate to achieve constitutionally mandated desegregation. In
Green, the Supreme Court first imposed an "affirmative duty" upon
every Southern school board that formerly operated a racially
segregated school system to "take whatever steps might be necessary
to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch."4 7 Green directed federal district judges,
in overseeing the transition of these school districts to "a unitary,
nonracial system of public education,"' to assess the racial impact of
school board actions in at least the following six areas of school
operations: (1) student attendance patterns, (2) faculty assignments,
39. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
40. Id. at 495.
41. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 149-
88 (3d rev. ed. 1974) (describing the campaign of massive public resistance by southern
political figures and their followers).
42. See James R. Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the
South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42,44 n.9 (1967).
43. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d,
2000d-1 to 2000d-4 (1994)).
44. See Gary Orfield, Turning Back to Segregation, in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION, supra note 19, at 1, 7-8.
45. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
46. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
47. Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
48. Id. at 436.
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(3) staff assignments, (4) transportation, (5) extra-curricular activities,
and (6) school facilities.49
Three years later, in Swann, a unanimous Court authorized
district courts to employ a variety of remedial tools as they oversaw
the desegregation process, including: (1) express racial goals for the
student population in each desegregating school; (2) express faculty
and staff racial ratios; (3) administrative "pairing" of geographically
dispersed neighborhoods within a school district, if necessary, to meet
these student and staff desegregation goals; and (4) cross-town busing
or other transportation remedies necessary to facilitate
desegregation.50 The Court expressly recognized that dismantling the
former dual systems would require school boards to consider race in
assigning school children and teachers to desegregated schools.
Proper remediation would require an "[a]wareness of the racial
composition of the whole school system," Chief Justice Burger wrote,
and "limited use ... of mathematical ratios ... was within the
equitable remedial discretion of the District Court. '51 Moreover, the
Court added that "school authorities should make every effort to
achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation [among
students] and will thus necessarily be concerned with the elimination
of one-race schools."52
The Court ratified the use of race-conscious assignment policies
even more explicitly in North Carolina State Board of Education v.
Swann,53 a companion case decided the same day as Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education. In North Carolina State
Board of Education, the Court unanimously struck down North
Carolina's anti-busing law,54 which had forbidden any assignment of
school children by race.55 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
described race-conscious student assignments as an essential tool to
fulfill "the promise of Brown" and rebuffed North Carolina's
contention that the federal Constitution required "colorblind"
student assignments.56 The North Carolina legislation, Chief Justice
Burger observed, "exploits an apparently neutral form to control
49. See id. at 435.
50. Swann, 402 U.S. at 22-31.
51. Id. at 25. Chief Justice Burger noted that the district court had set "a seventy-one
percent white, twenty-nine percent black target for assignment of students to most
Charlotte schools." Id. at 23.
52. Id. at 26.
53. 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
54. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176.1 (Supp. 1969) (repealed 1981).
55. See North Carolina State Bdl. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 46.
56. Id. at 45-46.
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school assignment plans by directing that they be 'color blind.' "
Moreover, to approve "colorblind" statutes, set "against the
background of segregation, would render illusory the promise of
Brown," and "deprive school authorities of the one tool absolutely
essential to [the] fulfillment of their constitutional obligation to
eliminate existing dual school systems."57
Green, Swann, and North Carolina State Board of Education
conveyed the Supreme Court's unmistakable impatience with the
long delay in ending school segregation that followed its 1954 Brown
decision, a deep skepticism toward official assurances of "good faith,"
and a steely-eyed demand for objective, measurable results in the
desegregation of students, faculties, administrative personnel, and
other aspects of public school life. While the Court tackled important
school issues outside the South,58 Green and Swann became the
touchstones of southern school desegregation litigation throughout
the 1970s and 1980s. Hundreds of judicial decrees were implemented
in formerly state-segregated districts, including scores in North
Carolina, in reliance upon the unanimous holdings of these cases.
C. The 1990s: Desegregation and "Unitary Status"
After nearly two decades in which the Supreme Court rarely
revisited its handiwork, a very differently constituted Court returned
to Southern school desegregation in the early 1990s to address the
question of "unitary status." In these new cases, the Court
considered how much progress school districts must demonstrate
before they may properly be found to have met their affirmative
duties, achieved unitary status, and earned freedom from further
federal court supervision. The Court's first substantive decision on
these issues59 came in Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public
57. Id.
58. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (holding that a federal court
lacked authority to order inter-district school segregation in a metropolitan area absent
proof that the district lines were drawn for racial reasons, or that the violations in one
school district caused segregation in an adjacent district); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (holding that a district-wide school desegregation
decree was warranted upon proof that a school board had administered its school statutes
with the intent to create or maintain racially segregated schools in a substantial portion of
the system).
59. In the mid-1980s the Supreme Court denied certiorari to review a Fourth Circuit
decision affirming a judgment that the schools of the City of Norfolk were "unitary" and
releasing the school district from further judicial supervision. See Riddick v. School Bd.,
784 F.2d 521, 538-39 (4th Cir. 1986), cerL denied 479 U.S. 938 (1986). Riddick was the
first important "unitary status" case decided by a federal circuit court.
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Schools v. Dowell' in 1991. From the outset, sharp differences in the
Court's tone and emphasis were clear. No longer unanimous-
indeed, sharply divided, in a five-to-three opinion authored by Chief
Justice Rehnquist-the Court began by stressing that "[flrom the very
first, federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a
temporary measure to remedy past discrimination. '61 Chief Justice
Rehnquist added that federal desegregation decrees were not meant
to operate in perpetuity, and that courts should endeavor to reinstate
local control by school authorities. "[A]fter the local authorities have
operated in compliance with [a desegregation decree] for a
reasonable period of time," citizens should be permitted to
participate in decision-making, and the school board should be free to
adopt new school programs to fit local needs.6 2 The Court remanded
Dowell to the district court, directing it to consider "whether the
[Oklahoma City] Board had complied in good faith with the
desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of
past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable." 63
A year later, the Court returned to the issue of unitary status in
Freeman v. Pius' Significantly, neither Dowell nor Freeman formally
repudiated the six Green factors or the Swann remedies; indeed, both
cases cited the Green factors with apparent approval,65 and the
Freeman Court even accepted the district court's inclusion of a
seventh factor in the calculus: "the quality of education being offered
to the white and black student populations." 66 Yet the Freeman
Court declined to agree with the civil rights plaintiffs that school
boards must meet all six Green goals simultaneously before seeking
unitary status.67  Instead, the Court endorsed an alternative,
piecemeal approach that the DeKalb County (Georgia) School Board
proposed, under which district courts might end their judicial
oversight of one or more Green factors where sufficient progress had
been shown-for example, in student assignments or facilities-even
if it were necessary to retain judicial oversight in another area where
unexplained racial variations remained.' The Freeman Court added
that this partial withdrawal of federal judicial oversight would be
60. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
61. Id. at 247.
62. Id. at 248.
63. Id at 249-50.
64. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
65. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 472-73,485-86; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250.
66. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 473.
67. See i& at 489-91.
68. See id- at 489-90.
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constitutionally permissible even if, following a period of compliance,
student populations subsequently became racially imbalanced, so long
as the emerging student imbalances could not plausibly be traced to
the board's former de jure segregation or to any intervening
misconduct by the school board.69
To aid federal courts in evaluating requests for the partial
withdrawal of judicial supervision, the Freeman Court directed
district judges to weigh three new factors:
[1] whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance
with the [desegregation] decree in those aspects of the
system where supervision is to be withdrawn; [2] whether
retention of judicial control is necessary or practicable to
achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of the
school system; and [3] whether the school district has
demonstrated ... its good-faith commitment to the whole of
the court's decree and to those provisions of the law and the
Constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention
in the first instance.70
Read broadly, these new factors appeared to adjust both the letter
and spirit of Green and Swann. For example, all three Freeman
factors subtly shifted judicial attention from a functional concern with
the real world consequences of school board actions-whether black
and white children were actually attending schools together-toward
a more formal concern with technical compliance. Thus, the first
factor replaced Green's demand for results that "work, and ... work
now"71 with the more modest demand that a school board simply
follow the letter of its desegregation decree. This emphasis on formal
compliance was reinforced by Freeman's emphasis on a school
board's "good-faith commitment."72  Under this reconception of
unitary status, solemn assurances replaced concrete outcomes as a
principal measure of compliance. Moreover, a crucial test of good
faith, the Supreme Court had earlier suggested in Dowell, was
"whether the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to
the extent practicable."'73 In Freeman, the Court reinforced this new
emphasis on practicability as a limit upon a school board's affirmative
69. See id at 494. The Court held that imbalances brought about by the private
housing choices of parents within the district did not constitute "state action" and would
therefore not implicate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
495.
70. Id. at 491.
71. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,439 (1968).
72. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491.
73. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,250 (1991).
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duties, emphasizing that no "heroic measures must be taken to ensure
racial balance in student assignments system wide." 74
Freeman's final contribution was to stress the temporary nature
of desegregation remedies. The "end purpose" of desegregation
litigation, it emphasized, must be "to remedy the violation and, in
addition, to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school
system,"75 underlining the belief that "[r]eturning schools to the
control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is essential"
to reestablish the "'vital national tradition' " of local school board
autonomy.76
The Freeman factors, therefore, have provided powerful new
weapons for ending desegregation lawsuits. Even if a school board's
actions have not been fully effective in achieving desegregation, a
district court might nonetheless conclude that they have succeeded
"to the extent practicable." A district court can disregard evidence of
continuing racial separation in a school district so long as it is not
"traceable in a proximate way"77 to former state misconduct but is,
instead, attributable to "private choices. 78 School board assertions of
"good faith" can be assigned a positive significance that Green had
denied them. In conducting their deliberations, moreover, federal
courts are charged to complete their work promptly, lift any
outstanding decrees, and restore local control as soon as possible.
The Supreme Court revisited public school desegregation issues
in Missouri v. Jenkins ("Jenkins III") in 1995.79 In this case Chief
Justice Rehnquist lifted the Freeman test from its original, narrower
context-"inform[ing] the sound discretion of the [district] court in
ordering partial withdrawal,"80 -and gave it a central role in all cases
in which defendants seek relief from further duties under a
desegregation decree.81 Collapsing Freeman's three-factor test into
two factors (and thus reducing the ultimate burden imposed on a
74. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 493.
75. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
76. Id at 490 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,410 (1977)).
77. Id. at 494.
78. Id. at 495.
79. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). Other aspects of the Kansas City school case, pending since
1977, had received Supreme Court review on two previous occasions. See id. at 74-78. In
1989, the Court upheld a grant of attorneys fees to counsel for the civil rights plaintiffs.
See Missouri v. Jenkins ("Jenkins I"), 491 U.S. 274 (1989). In 1990, the Court held that the
district court had abused its remedial discretion by unilaterally adjusting the local property
tax rate to pay for court-ordered school improvements. See Missouri v. Jenkins ("Jenkins
II"), 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
80. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491 (emphasis added).
81. See Jenkins 111, 515 U.S. at 88-89.
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defendant school board), Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "[t]he
ultimate inquiry is '"whether the [constitutional violator] ha[s]
complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was
entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been
eliminated to the extent practicable." ' 1)82
Further reshaping the Freeman test, the Chief Justice appeared
to alter the traditional burdens of proof on the parties by suggesting
that before a district court could order additional measures to
eliminate continuing racial disparities, "it must identify 'the
incremental effect' that prior de jure segregation had" upon the
continuing vestiges under consideration. 3  "[N]umerous external
factors," the Court suggested, might contribute to continuing racial
disparities, but "[s]o long as these external factors are not the result
of [state-ordered] segregation, they do not figure in the remedial
calculus." 84  If these remarks represent a new burden of proof
assigned by the Court, they constitute a significant departure from
previous jurisprudence. Since the time of Green in 1968, the Court
had placed the burden to explain such racial disparities on school
boards;85 Freeman expressly reaffirmed that allocation of proof as
recently as 1992.6 Yet Chief Justice Rehnquist's discussion in Jenkins
III seemed to reverse this allocation: unless a civil rights plaintiff can
demonstrate affirmatively that continuing racial disparities are
traceable to prior school board actions, it may be error for a district
judge to consider them.
Together, Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins III have eased
considerably the constitutional demands on formerly segregated
school districts and have invited the new round of unitary status
litigation that is presently underway, offering school districts the
prospect of a speedier and more successful trip to the federal
courthouse. In marked contrast to the Green/Swann era, judicial
impatience by the late 1990s had less to do with school board delays
than with ongoing civil rights litigation. The Supreme Court
presently reserves its skepticism for continued judicial involvement
rather than school board protestations of good faith, and its demand
82. Id at 89 (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Dowell,
498 U.S. 237,249-50 (1991)) (alterations in original)).
83. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 101.
84. Id. at 102.
85. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,439 (1968).
86. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494 (reiterating that "[tihe school district bears the
burden of showing that any current imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the
prior violation").
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seems less for effective desegregation than for a return to local
control.
D. School Boards' Freedom to Promote Diversity Outside the
Remedial Context-Earlier Precedents
The recent Capacchione, Tuttle, and Eisenberg decisions, as I
suggested in the Introduction, announce a sweeping new rule: school
boards qperating without the protection of court-ordered
desegregation decrees violate the Fourteenth Amendment if they
self-consciously use racial or ethnic criteria in assigning students to
public schools. In this concluding portion of Part I, I examine the
Supreme Court's pre-1995 precedents that addressed this specific
issue.
The most prominent of these precedents is Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Educations' itself, in which Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Court, contrasted the limited authority
reposed in the federal judiciary to remedy constitutional violations
with the far broader discretion that school boards possess when they
make racial assignments for pedagogical reasons:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad
power to formulate and implement educational policy and
might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare
students to live in a pluralistic society each school should
have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting
the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an
educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of
school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional
violation, however, that would not be within the authority of
a federal court 8
Subsequently, then-Justice Rehnquist, acting on an application
for a stay pending certiorari in Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education89 in
1978, rejected a Fourteenth Amendment argument put forward by
white parents who were unhappy with a voluntary, race-conscious
student assignment plan being implemented in Los Angeles County,
California. 90 He noted that their "novel" argument seemed to depend
upon an assumption "that each citizen of a State who is either a
parent or a schoolchild has a 'federal right' to be 'free from racial
87. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
88. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
89. 439 U.S. 1380 (1978).
90. See id. at 1382-83.
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quotas and to be free from extensive pupil transportation.'-"1
Although Justice Rehnquist emphasized that California was under no
federal constitutional obligation to undertake voluntary
desegregation efforts, he wrote that he had "very little doubt that it
was permitted... to take such action." 9
A third voice recognizing the constitutional distinction between
judicially required and educationally chosen uses of race in school
assignment emanated from Justice Powell in Keyes v. School District
No. 1, Denver, Colorado.93 Even as he urged the Court to abandon all
distinctions between de jure and de facto school segregation and to
require every school board to integrate its schools, Justice Powell
added that, beyond his proposed new constitutional duty, "[s]chool
boards would, of course, be free to develop and initiate further plans
to promote school desegregation." 94 Underscoring the need in our
"pluralistic society" to teach "students of all races [to] learn to play,
work, and cooperate with one another," Justice Powell insisted that
his opinion in Keyes was not "meant to discourage school boards
from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in promoting the
values of an integrated school experience." 95 In sum, Justice Powell
added his voice to those of Chief Justice Burger in Swann and then-
Justice Rehnquist in Bustop, expressly affirming that school boards
could engage in voluntary, race-conscious student assignments for
educational reasons without violating the federal Constitution.
96
One of the most difficult and contentious issues to confront the
Supreme Court during the 1970s was whether public institutions of
higher education could use race as a criterion for admission to their
institutions. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke in
1978, a disappointed applicant to the University of California at Davis
Medical School challenged a policy that set aside sixteen out of one
hundred seats in each entering class for applicants from certain
91. Id. at 1383.
92. Id-
93. 413 U.S. 189,242 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. See also Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that a
school district's voluntary use of race in making school assignments to end de facto
segregation is constitutionally permissible when "its use is to insure against, rather than to
promote deprivation of equal educational opportunity"); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710,
720 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that a New York state statutory provision that forbade state
officials or appointed school boards from assigning students or from altering school
attendance zones in order to improve racial balance was unconstitutional), affd, 402 U.S.
935 (1971).
97. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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minority groups.9" In resolving this challenge, the Court fractured
into three groups. The first group, a more liberal faction of four
Justices, contended that "benign" uses of race (such as affirmative
action to increase the number of minority students attending
institutions of higher education) should be judicially reviewed under
the Fourteenth Amendment applying a less exacting "intermediate"
standard that would be satisfied by demonstrating that a state's use of
race was "substantially related" to an "important governmental
interest," such as the redress of prior "societal discrimination. '" 99 A
second group of four more conservative Justices would not have
reached the Fourteenth Amendment issues in Bakke at all, urging
instead that any race-conscious behavior violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.10°
Justice Powell's judgment for the Court drew four votes from
more liberal Justices on some positions and four votes from more
conservative Justices on others. While every major facet of his
opinion commanded five votes, no other Justice agreed with his entire
opinion. Justice Powell did reach the Fourteenth Amendment issues
in Bakke and concluded that the state's use of race in admissions
decisions required strict scrutiny by the federal courts-proof that the
racial considerations were "precisely tailored" to accomplish a
"compelling" state interest.101 In addition, Justice Powell, joined by
the four liberal Justices, held that the "attainment of a diverse student
body.., clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution
of higher education."' 1 2  Nevertheless, he did not approve the
particular use of race made by the University of California at Davis
Medical School during its admissions process and reasoned that
"[e]thnic diversity ... is only one element in a range of factors a
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a
heterogeneous student body."' 3 In sum, Justice Powell's opinion
held that while achieving student diversity in higher education is a
compelling state interest sufficient to survive strict scrutiny by a
federal court, and while race may constitutionally be used as a "plus"
factor in admissions decisions, race may not be employed as the sole
98. See id. at 269-75.
99. 1d at 361-62 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
100. See id. at 411-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Chief Justice Burger, then-Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stewart joined in Justice
Stevens's opinion.
101. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299,305.
102. Id. at 311-12,314.
103. Id. at 314.
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factor in determining admission for seats in an entering medical
school class.1°4
In subsequent years, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke became a
familiar guidepost for those shaping thousands of voluntary
admissions policies, not only for institutions of higher education,10 5
but also for elementary and secondary schools as well. The Supreme
Court, fully informed of this widespread reliance upon Bakke, never
thereafter directly renounced or sought reconsideration of that
decision.
In 1982, the Supreme Court addressed a statewide initiative in
the State of Washington that effectively curtailed the efforts of the
Seattle School District No. 1 to engage in the voluntary, race-
conscious desegregation of its public schools."° The school district,
after recognizing that "segregated housing patterns in Seattle ha[d]
created racially imbalanced schools" 107  and that its prior
administrative efforts had not succeeded, formally defined "racial
balance" goals and resolved to eliminate all imbalances within three
years.0 5 In response, a citizen group placed an initiative on the
Washington State ballot for the November 1978 general election that
would have required local boards to assign students to schools nearest
their homes under ordinary circumstances and would have permitted
busing for racial purposes only in compliance with a court order.109
After the initiative succeeded with Washington voters, the school
district challenged its constitutionality in federal court. The Supreme
Court ultimately struck down the initiative under the Equal
Protection Clause, reasoning that it violated the principles of Hunter
v. Erickson,"0 since it "remove[d] the authority to address a racial
104. Id at 316-18.
105. For the application of the Bakke principle by colleges and universities, see
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSrrY ADMISSIONS 8
(1998) ("On the authority of Justice Powell's decisive opinion in Bakke, virtually all
selective colleges and professional schools have continued to consider race in admitting
students.") and BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATiVE ACMION AND
THE SUPREME COURT 154 (1988) ("A special committee appointed to analyze [New York
University Law School's] admission policy in light of the Bakke decision reported that the
policy should be guided by the Powell opinion.").
106. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
107. Id. at 460.
108. Id.
109. See id at 462-63.
110. 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating, as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a
city charter amendment that singled out ordinances to bar racial or religious
discrimination in housing barring their adoption unless the ordinances received majority
support from city voters at a general election).
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problem-and only a racial problem-from the existing
decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority
interests.""' In announcing a conclusion for five members"' of the
Court, Justice Blackmun clearly assumed that no federal
constitutional principle would forbid Seattle or other school districts
from enacting voluntary, race-conscious student assignments.
Although acknowledging that such assignments, especially when
accomplished by busing for desegregation, often engendered strong
public controversy,' Justice Blackmun held that in the absence of a
constitutional violation, "the desirability and efficacy of school
desegregation are matters to be resolved through the political
process.""' 4 The Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Seattle
School District No. I freed the local school board to resume its
mandatory efforts to desegregate its schools by race, despite State
efforts to impede the choice of the local board.
The dissenting opinion by Justice Powell did not dispute the
authority of the local board under the federal constitution to engage
in race-conscious assignment, but focused instead on whether federal
courts should intrude on a state's decision to constrain its local school
boards by restricting their student assignment policies through the
political process." 5
Thus, in nearly half a dozen decisions rendered over a twelve-
year period-Swann, Bustop, Keyes, Bakke, and Seattle School
District No. 1-the Court itself or various of its Justices gave express
approval and constitutional sanction to the voluntary use of race by
states or local governmental agencies to achieve ends of educational
diversity.
II. THE DUAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CAPACCHIONE V. CHARLOTTE-
MECKLENBURG
On September 9, 1999, after nearly thirty-five years of judicial
oversight, the United States District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina terminated a lawsuit originally filed against the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education alleging that the board
had long maintained a racially segregated "dual system" of public
schooling."6 The court's decision in Capacchione v. Charlotte-
111. Washington, 458 U.S. at 474.
112. Joining Justice Blackmun were Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens.
113. Washington, 458 U.S. at 473.
114. Id. at 474.
115. ld. at 488-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
116. The Honorable Robert Potter, who presided over the combined cases and entered
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Mecklenburg School Board," currently on appeal to the Fourth
Circuit, disposed of two separate lawsuits that the district court
consolidated in 1998. The first was the long-standing school
desegregation lawsuit, originally known as Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,"' the earlier history of which I
reviewed in Part I above."9 The second lawsuit (which I refer to here
as Capacchione '97) was brought in 1997 by William Capacchione, a
parent who alleged that the Charlotte school board's use of racial
guidelines adversely affected his daughter's chances of admission to a
magnet school. Mr. Capacchione drew upon Croson, Adarand, and
several district and circuit court opinions to argue that any use of
racial classifications by the school board other than to remediate its
own prior discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause.120 The
Capacchione '97 lawsuit broadened when other white and Latino
parents intervened, asserting similar claims and similar injury on
behalf of their own children.'
The school board responded to these claims by moving to dismiss
Capacchione '97, alleging that its race-conscious assignments were
made pursuant to court orders that were sanctioned by the federal
the order, was no stranger to the Swann litigation. In 1969, acting as a private attorney,
Potter represented the Concerned Parents Association, a group of several thousand white
parents who gathered in May of 1969 in opposition to the desegregation decrees of then-
district judge James B. McMillan. The parents signed a petition, drafted by Potter, that
called upon the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board to submit a student assignment plan
in response to Judge McMillan's desegregation order that would "'retain the freedom of
any student to attend the school of his choice' " and would oppose all court-ordered
busing for desegregative purposes. FRYE GAILLARD, THE DREAM LONG DEFERRED 59
(1988) (quoting the petition). The petition also urged the school board to appeal any
decision of the federal court that did not observe these principles. See id. Potter later
appeared before the board in support of the petition.
Subsequently, in 1974, Potter wrote a letter opposing James Lanning as a
candidate for a state judicial position because of his involvement as a lawyer for the
minority plaintiffs in Swann. Lanning, who later served as Chief Judge of the
Mecklenburg County District Court, observed that Potter "was the only lawyer I'm aware
of that raised an issue that you shouldn't be a judge if you'd worked for desegregation of
the schools." Jim Morrill, Trial Brings School Case Full Circle: Veteran Judge Will Set
Tone for Future, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Apr. 18, 1999, at 1A (appearing in Deciding
Desegregation: A Continuing Series).
117. 57 F. Supp. 2d 228 (W.D.N.C. 1999).
118. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
119. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. The procedural history of Swann is
set forth at length in Capacchione. See Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 232-39.
120. See Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 239-41.
121. See id. at 240; Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 179 F.R.D.
505, 506 (W.D.N.C. 1998) (granting leave to these additional parents to intervene in the
consolidated proceedings of Swann '99 and Capacchione '97).
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court in Swann." At that point, the original Swann plaintiffs (a
group of African-American parents) quickly moved to reactivate that
long-dormant lawsuit, alleging that remaining vestiges of the prior
dual system still needed remedy"P The Capacchione '97 plaintiffs
countered that the Charlotte system had long ago achieved unitary
status and that any court orders that might still permit race-conscious
student assignments should be vacated and the Swann lawsuit
dismissed. 24
The district court, recognizing that these lawsuits shared many
questions of law and fact, denied the school board's motion to dismiss
Capacchione '97, restored Swann (which I earlier designed as Swann
'99) to its active docket, and consolidated Swann '99 and Capacchione
'97 for trial."z  The court then permitted the Capacchione '97
plaintiffs to intervene in Swann "99126 and eventually rendered a joint
opinion (which I have designated as Capacchione '99).127 The first
portion of that joint opinion, as noted above, held that the Charlotte
system is unitary thereby dissolving all prior desegregation orders and
thus dismissed the thirty-five year-old desegregation lawsuit. 12 In the
companion Capacchione '97 litigation, however, the court imposed on
the newly freed Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board a novel
injunctive order, enjoining it from "any further use of race-based
lotteries, preferences, and set-asides in student assignment. '"12 9 In so
ruling, the district court agreed with the Capacchione '97 plaintiffs'
contention that "in a non-remedial, unitary status setting, the use of
race in the admissions process does not further a compelling
governmental interest."' 30
A. The District Court's Decision to End the Swann Litigation
The original Swann plaintiffs, as indicated, entered this round of
the litigation to oppose an end to the Swann litigation. They
contended that, in a number of important respects, the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg School Board had failed to fulfill its affirmative duties
122. See Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
123. See id. at 239-40.
124. See id. at 240.
125. See Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 179 F.R.D. 177, 178-79
(W.D.N.C. 1998).
126. See Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 179 F.R.D. 502, 504-05
(W.D.N.C. 1998) (granting leave to Capacchione to intervene in Swann).
127. See Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 240,293.
128. See id- at 232, 284.
129. Id at 292.
130. Id. at 291.
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under Green as well as earlier decrees issued in Swann.131 In
response, the defendant schoolboard adopted what the district court
termed "a bizarre posture," agreeing with the plaintiffs "that it ha[d]
not complied with the Court's [prior] orders," that Charlotte-
Mecklenburg retained vestiges of the old dual system, that the system
was not yet unitary, and that the Swann '99 lawsuit should therefore
not be dismissed. 32 Indeed, throughout the lengthy trial in 1999,133
the school board and the plaintiffs offered similar constitutional
arguments and relied on overlapping evidence and expert
witnesses.134
Applying the newly emerged jurisprudence of Dowell, Freeman,
and Jenkins III, the district court conducted a unitary status analysis,
assessing each of the six Green factors in order to determine whether
the Charlotte school board had eliminated the vestiges of its formerly
dual system. 35 I will not review the district court's factual findings in
131. The plaintiffs placed special emphasis on the school board's failure to respond
adequately to the district court's opinion in Martin v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 475 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D.N.C. 1979), which rejected a challenge to the original
Swann orders brought by an earlier group of white parents and which concluded that the
school board had not yet met its obligations in four discrete areas, including the siting of
new schools, the location of primary schools, the monitoring of student transfer requests,
and the equitable allocation of transportation burdens. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants
(Corrected) at 20-38, Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. (4th Cir. filed Feb. 1,
2000) (Nos. 99-2389, 99-2391) (detailing the board's failure to comply with the Martin
order and faulting the district court for overlooking or disregarding them).
132. Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
133. The Charlotte Observer devoted extraordinary attention to the two lawsuits. For
an extensive collection of articles that profile the parties, their lawyers, the district judge,
and the day-by-day testimony during the three-month trial, see Charlotte Observer,
Deciding Desegregation. A Continuing Series (visited Sept. 1, 2000)
<http:llwww.charlotte.comlobserverspecialldeseg>.
134. The district court alleged that this stance stemmed from an invidious underlying
motivation: "[the Charlotte school board] now wishes to use [the prior Swann] order as a
pretext to pursue race-conscious, diversity-enhancing policies in perpetuity."
Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
135. See id. at 242-85. The court's detailed analysis is instructive on the application of
desegregation standards that other plaintiffs and school boards are likely to face in unitary
status litigation in the new millennium. For example, in Cappachione, the court explored
in considerable detail the myriad changes in student assignments since 1971 to assess
whether the vestiges of the old, racially dual assignment system remain. The complexities
evaluated by the court included the following: (1) at least 15 separate court orders over
time that touched upon student assignments issues, not all of them fully consistent
(thereby raising an issue of what benchmark orders the court should use in evaluating the
board's "good faith compliance"); (2) a bewildering array of year-by-year variations in the
racial composition of each of the elementary and secondary schools over a 30-year period;
(3) the impact of different, interactive demographic trends on assignment patterns,
including strong overall population growth in Mecklenburg County, the development of
many predominantly white residential areas in the northern and southern extremes of the
county, and the disproportionate growth of the black student population in the 1970s and
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detail, except to note the fundamental disagreement between the
Swann '99 plaintiffs and the Charlotte board on the one hand, and the
Capacchione '99 parties (and the district court itself) on the other,
over the import of much of the evidence presented at trial. The
Swann '99 plaintiffs urged that the school board had long failed to
take various steps, contemplated by an earlier court order in the
Swann case,'36 that would have led to greater student desegregation,
and they noted that a trend toward growing racial imbalances
throughout the 1990s.37 The Charlotte school board agreed and, one
week before trial, presented the district court with a new" 'controlled
choice'" plan which, it argued, had great promise to reduce the
growing imbalance and bring about further student desegregation.1 38
The district court found the Swann '99 plaintiffs' arguments
substantially weakened by their failure to request any modifications
of the court's student assignment orders between 1975 and 1998
(when the Capacchione '97 plaintiffs first sought to declare the district
"unitary"). 39 The district court also relied on Freeman v. Pitts4 ' to
dismiss the school board's argument that still further student
desegregation was possible in the Charlotte system. According to the
court, the school board's argument was "premised on an erroneous
legal assumption: that racial balance is to be pursued wherever and
whenever it is possible."' 4' After finding that the Charlotte school
1980s; (4) the racial significance of the siting of various new schools within the county; and
(5) the weight and significance of trends toward greater racial imbalance in some schools
in more recent years. See id.
136. See Martin v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 475 F. Supp. 1318, 1328-40
(W.D.N.C. 1979), affd, 626 F.2d 1165, 1167 (4th Cir. 1980).
137. See Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 250-51, 255; see also Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants (Corrected) at 26-36, 43-45, 46-48, Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ. (4th Cir. filed Feb. 1, 2000) (Nos. 99-2389, 99-2391) (arguing that the district court
misunderstood, misstated, and improperly evaluated much of the pertinent evidence;
hence, that its factual findings on the persistence of vestiges of segregation in student
assignments, quality of school facilities, and faculty assignments were clearly erroneous
under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
138. Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 256.
139. See id. at 253; see also id. at 282 (assessing the school board's "good faith
compliance," the district court noted that "since the final order was entered in Swann in
1975, the Swann plaintiffs have never filed a motion for further relief").
140. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
141. Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 250; see also id. at 255-56 (stating that further
adjustments of the racial composition of the school system are not required once the duty
to desegregate has been satisfied). The district court quoted the Supreme Court's holding
in Freeman:
Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake. It is to be pursued when
racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation. Once the racial
imbalance due to the de jure violation has been remedied, the school district is
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board had "complied fully and satisfactorily with the student
assignment aspects of the court-ordered desegregation plan" and
concluding that whatever racial disparities still plagued the public
schools were either de minimus or were caused by factors other than
the present effects of prior segregation, the district court held that the
school system's student assignment plans had "achieved its objective
of creating a unitary school system.., to the extent practicable.""14
The Swann plaintiffs and the Charlotte board fared no better as
the court turned its consideration, one by one, to the other Green
factors-faculty assignments, staff assignments, facilities and
resources, transportation, extracurricular activities-and to a number
of additional areas that plaintiffs contended were plagued by
continuing racial disparities, including teacher quality, student
achievement, and student discipline. 43 In all of these areas, the court
found either that the racial disparities were minimal or that
continuing racial disparities were tied to factors, such as changing
demographics, largely beyond the Charlotte board's control.'
B. The District Court's Injunction Against Future Use of Racial
Considerations in Student Assignments
The Capacchione '99 lawsuit was precipitated by the Charlotte
board's adoption in 1992 of a more flexible and effective student
assignment alternative-magnet schools-that promised to afford
choices not available to parents under mandatory student assignment
plans. The Charlotte board turned to magnet schools in the early
1990s, hoping they could attract children of various races and thereby
decrease the growing racial imbalance emerging in many schools
under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors.
i at 250 (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494).
142. ld. at 257; see also id at 249-56 (detailing the evidence in support of the district
court's factual conclusions).
143. See id. at 257-82.
144. See, e.g., iL at 261 (finding that "the remaining imbalance [in faculty assignments]
is too small to be considered indicative of a school system that is segregating its faculty,"
and that "the deficiencies are generally attributable to factors outside [the Charlotte
board's] control, such as the shortage of teachers and the impact of residential
demographics on schools' faculty compositions"); id. at 266-67 (finding that "inequities in
facilities exist throughout the system regardless of the racial makeup of the school" and
that "no witness was able to provide any evidence to show a causal link between current
disparities in facilities and the dual system"). The Swann '99 plaintiffs have contested as
clearly erroneous the district court's findings both on faculty assignments and on the
adequacy of facilities and resources in their appeal to the Fourth Circuit. See Brief of
Plaintiffs-Appellants (Corrected) at 38-48, Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.
(4th Cir. filed Feb. 1, 2000) (Nos. 99-2389, 99-2391).
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throughout the district. 5  Magnet schools are designed to draw
substantial numbers of students of different backgrounds by offering
special curricula, such as communications arts, Montessori methods,
advanced math and science, or foreign languages. They are lauded by
many conservative critics of school desegregation as a preferable
means in achieving diversity, because they are filled by voluntary,
student- and parent-initiated requests rather than by mandatory
student assignments. 46
The Capacchione '97 parents complained that although the board
now permitted greater parental choice, it continued to honor its
outstanding desegregation orders by employing racial criteria in
selecting students from among magnet school applicants. The actual
selection process used in Charlotte offered available seats first to
applicants who resided especially close to the schools and to those
who had siblings already attending the schools. 47 Thereafter
"selected students from a black [student] lottery and a non-black
[student] lottery until the precise racial balance [reflecting the
systemwide racial composition was] achieved."" s Mr. Capacchione
alleged that his daughter had been denied admission to the magnet
school of her choice "due to a rigid racial enrollment quota."14 9
One irony in the court's ultimate resolution of Capacchione '97 is
that its injunction implicitly undermined the most celebrated value in
the Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence since
Milliken v. Bradley50 in 1974: "local control over the operation of
schools."'51  In Milliken, the Court described local control as
"essential," because it "affords citizens an opportunity to participate
in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school programs to fit
local needs, and encourages 'experimentation, innovation, and a
healthy competition for educational excellence.' "152 In another key
145. See Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 239; see also id. at 249-50 (providing greater
detail on the rationale and design of the 1992 adoption of the magnet schools approach).
146. See generally DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
AND THE LAw 223-25 (1995) (highlighting the administrative and social advantages of
voluntary magnet school programs); CHRISTINE H. ROSSELLE, THE CARROT OR THE
STICK FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY: MAGNET SCHOOLS OR FORCED BUSING
209-11 (1990) (same).
147. See Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 287.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 239.
150. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
151. Id. at 741 (stating that local control of schools is the most "deeply rooted"
tradition in public education).
152. Id. at 741-42 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50
(1973)); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995) (reemphasizing that "our cases
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opinion stressing local control of education, San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,53 Justice Powell stressed that the federal
judiciary's "lack of specialized knowledge and experience" about
public education should counsel against interference with informed
judgments made by local school officials, especially since the judicial
exposition of "inflexible constitutional restraints ... could
circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and
to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions."'-' Although the
Charlotte board's move to magnet schools had the electoral support
of its citizenry, though its magnet school programs were designed to
"keep[] abreast of ever-changing conditions,"'55 and though the board
was acting to assure public school diversity as an educational goal, the
district court in Capacchione '99 wrenched away from the board, with
one hand, the very autonomy it purported to bestow with the other.
C. A Critique of the District Court's Decision
As indicated, the district court resolved two clusters of knotty
questions in deciding these cases. The first involved the legal and
factual issues that flowed directly from the old Swann case: whether
in light of the new jurisprudence of Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins III,
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district was no longer a racially
dual system, but desegregated to the extent practicable and therefore
unitary. Although those questions are difficult, and their answers
recognize that local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition... and that a
district court must strive to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school
system operating in compliance with the Constitution"); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
490 (1992) (declaring that to return "schools to the control of local authorities at the
earliest practicable date is essential to restore their true accountability in our
governmental system"); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-48 (1991) (observing
that "[flrom the very first, federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a
temporary measure to remedy past discrimination"); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) (asserting that "local autonomy of school districts is a vital
national tradition").
153. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
154. Id. at 42-43; see also United States v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., 960 F.2d 1227,
1233 (4th Cir. 1992) (lauding "[tihe local determination of school attendance zones" as "a
tradition as rich as the neighborhood school itself"); cf Boring v. Buncombe County Bd.
of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 1998) (insisting that "it is far better public policy" to
entrust school curricular decisions "to the local school authorities" than to teachers "who
would be responsible only to ... judges"); id. at 371 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring)
(condemning the tendency to "approach education as a federal judicial enterprise," rather
than to afford "school boards the right to direct their educational curricula through
democratic means").
155. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 43.
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invite serious criticism, I will not address them here. Instead, I will
focus on the second legal question presented by Capacchione '99:
whether the school board's continued use of race-conscious selection
processes in its magnet schools, or in other student assignment
choices, following a finding of unitary status, violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
The district court began its analysis by turning to Croson,
Adarand, and related cases, from which it identified two premises:
first, that all racial classifications, "regardless of whether the
classification is intended to burden or benefit a particular race, 1 s6
must survive strict judicial scrutiny; and second, that "[m]odern
Supreme Court precedent suggests that there is only one compelling
state interest that will justify race-based classifications: remedying
the effects of past racial discrimination. '157 For this second premise,
the court cited only Croson, a dissent from Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. Federal Communications Commission,"8 and a Fifth Circuit
decision regarding admissions decisions at the University of Texas
Law School.15 9
The district court reasoned from its two major premises that,
although the Charlotte board's prior use of race may have been
justified in response to the original Swann case-since its legal
obligation was to rectify its own prior, adjudicated acts of
discrimination-once the board was granted unitary status, it was
deprived of any compelling state end that might justify its use of race-
based criteria in future student assignments. The court held that
"[a]bsent a constitutionally permissible remedial justification, [the
Charlotte school board] shall not foreclose students from
consideration for admission into certain schools or educational
programs simply because of their racial or ethnic category."' 160
Although the narrowest reading of the district court's order
prohibited only the school board's use of racial devices in making
admissions decisions involving magnet schools, its rationale is
156. Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 241
(W.D.N.C. 1999).
157. Id.
158. 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy joined in Justice O'Connor's dissent. See Metro Broadcasting, 497
U.S. at 602.
159. See Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 241 (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944
(5th Cir. 1996)).
160. 1d at 292; see also id. at 241 (stating that remedial classifications are the only race-
based classifications that constitute a compelling state interest).
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undeniably broader. It appears to forestall all voluntary use of racial
criteria by the Charlotte school board in making any student
assignments, whether to special magnet schools or to other schools or
programs.
As I contended earlier, when a court so profoundly alters the
prior educational (and judicial) landscape, it is obligated both to
substantiate its own reading of binding precedents and to confront
and distinguish any contrary precedents. Capacchione has done
neither. The National School Boards Association and the North
Carolina School Boards Association have since argued that the
district court's first premise is faulty, since "strict scrutiny ought not
apply to racial diversity efforts in student assignment."'' I will not
address that argument here, because Supreme Court precedents
provide plausible, though hardly irrefutable, support for the district
court's assumption that all race-conscious governmental actions must
survive strict judicial scrutiny.
Instead, I will examine the second linchpin of the district court's
reasoning-its assertion that "[m]odern Supreme Court precedent
suggests that there is only one compelling state interest that will
justify race-based classifications: remedying the effects of past racial
discrimination."'6  If this statement were legally accurate or
precedentially compelled, the district court's overall judgment would
be legally sound (even if pedagogically destructive). Because it is
neither, the district court's order and holding are gravely deficient.
161. Brief of Amici Curiae North Carolina School Boards Association and National
School Boards Association at 16, Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. (4th Cir.
filed Feb. 1, 2000) (Nos. 99-2389, 99-2391). Their argument depends upon three broad
propositions. First, they contend that "[c]onstitutional claims are analyzed differently
when they arise in the public school context." Id at 17. As support for this contention,
they cite several Supreme Court decisions, in a variety of other constitutional contexts,
that modify general constitutional holdings within the school context. See, e.g., Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (shaping a special First Amendment
free speech doctrine for the public school context); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 240
(1985) (modifying Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections in the public school
context); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (declining to extend Eighth
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment to the public school
context); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (addressing special procedural due
process concerns within the public school context); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (addressing First Amendment symbolic
expression in the public school context). Second, they argue that "diversity in student
assignments ... does not hold the same potential harms that race consciousness does in
other areas." Brief of Amici Curiae North Carolina School Boards Association and
National School Boards Association at 21, Belk (4th Cir. filed Feb. 1, 2000) (Nos. 99-2389,
99-2391). Finally, they argue that there is a compelling state interest in promoting
educational diversity. See id. at 26.
162. Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 241.
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1. The Dubious Doctrinal Support
An investigation of the "[m]odern Supreme Court precedent" 63
invoked by the district court properly begins with Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Croson, the Richmond set-aside case. The "initial battle"
among the parties to Croson, as Justice O'Connor recounted, was
"the scope of the city's power to adopt legislation designed to address
the effects of past discrimination."'" In Croson, the parties drew
their battle lines over the reach of the Court's prior decision in
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 65 which recognized Congressional authority to
engage in race-conscious remedial relief in order "to identify and
redress the effects of society-wide discrimination."' 66 In her Croson
opinion, Justice O'Connor explained that the latitude allowed
Congress by Fullilove was dependent upon "the unique remedial
powers of Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 67 Because of its unique role "to enforce the dictates
of the Fourteenth Amendment" under Section 5, Fullilove allowed
Congress to use racial classifications to "identify and redress the
effects of society-wide discrimination" under a more deferential
standard of judicial review.'6 In contrast, Justice O'Connor reasoned
that "the States and their political subdivisions are [not] free to
decide that such remedies are appropriate. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is an explicit constraint on state power, and
the States must undertake any remedial efforts in accordance with that
provision." 16 9
The Croson Court went on to identify two remedial interests that
163. Id.
164. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,486 (1989).
165. 448 U.S. 448 (1980), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).
166. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490. Fullilove upheld a "minority business enterprise"
provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6701-6736 (1995 & Supp. 2000)), that required the
Secretary of Commerce to obtain assurances that 10% of every public works project
funded under the Act would be expended for businesses that were at least 50% owned by
"minority group members," defined in racial, ethnic, and national origin terms. See
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453-54.
167. Croson, 488 U.S. at 488.
168. Id. at 490. Justice O'Connor later repudiated this distinction in Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 230-31, 235 (observing that "various Members of th[e] Court have taken different views
of the authority [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress to deal
with the problem of racial discrimination, and the extent to which courts should defer to
Congress' exercise of that authority," but holding, for a majority of the Court, that
"[f]ederal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental
interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest").
169. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).
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might justify a state or city's use of racial classifications-to redress its
own prior, proven discrimination or to end its "'passive
particip[ation]'" in an entrenched system of racial exclusion in the
private market. 70 What is crucial for my purpose is that Justice
O'Connor's account did not purport to catalogue all circumstances in
which race might properly be used; Croson simply was not a case in
which the Supreme Court set out to identify the full roster of state
interests that might be sufficiently compelling to justify state use of
racial distinctions. Instead, Croson addressed a more limited
question: what is the authority of a state or city to use race within a
remedial context? Croson answers that remedial uses of race by state
actors must be carefully circumscribed. 7'
To be sure, one voice in Croson strongly urges that the only
permissible uses of race are for remedial purposes and that even then
such uses must be employed sparingly. The voice is that of Justice
Scalia, who wrote that "only a social emergency rising to the level ofimminent danger to life and limb" could justify non-remedial, race-
conscious state action. 72  Justice Scalia later summarized his
contention: "In my view there is only one circumstance in which the
States may act by race to 'undo the effects of past discrimination:'
where that is necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a
system of unlawful racial classification."'173
170. Id. at 491-92; see also id. at 504 (maintaining that a state may use racial
classifications to address its own prior discrimination, but may not rely merely on findings
of national historical discrimination in a particular field to justify using racial
classifications). Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White joined this portion of
Justice O'Connor's opinion; elsewhere, she spoke for at least five members of the Court.
See id. at 476.
171. See id. at 493 (stating that strict judicial scrutiny is necessary for remedial racial
classifications so that a court can determine "[w]hat classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics").
172. ld. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). His full quotation reads as
follows:
I do not agree ... with Justice O'Connor's dictum suggesting that, despite the
Fourteenth Amendment, state and local governments may in some circumstances
discriminate on the basis of race in order (in a broad sense) "to ameliorate the
effects of past discrimination." The benign purpose of compensating for social
disadvantages, whether they have been acquired by reason of prior
discrimination or otherwise, can no more be pursued by the illegitimate means of
racial discrimination than can other assertedly benign purposes we have
repeatedly rejected .... At least where state or local action is at issue, only a
social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb-for
example, a prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates ... can
justify an exception to the principle....
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
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Indeed, no Justice in Croson came closer than did Justice Scalia
to addressing the very issue before the federal district court in
Capacchione '99-the use of voluntary, race-conscious methods by
school boards outside of a remedial context. Justice Scalia first
acknowledged the large body of Supreme Court desegregation law,
including Green and Swann, that sanctioned the use of race-conscious
student assignment by school boards to remediate their own prior
discrimination. He then added: "[lit is implicit in our cases that after
the dual school system has been completely disestablished, the States
may no longer assign students by race."'' 4 It is revealing, however,
that Justice Scalia's sole authority for the "implicit" principle he
attempted to identify was a single "cf." citation to the Court's 1976
decision in Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler.7 5 Upon
examination, Pasadena offers no support at all for Justice Scalia's
position. Indeed, the case stands for the very different proposition
that once a dual system has been completely disestablished, federal
courts may not order further race-conscious relief.176 Pasadena says
absolutely nothing about the latitude open to school boards that act
voluntarily. It is no wonder, then, that Justice Scalia graced his
principal authority with a "cf." citation.
If Justice Scalia spoke for the unanimous Supreme Court, or
even for a bare majority of Justices, Capacchione '99 would have
found its "[m]odern Supreme Court precedent" on point. Yet no
other Justice chose to join Justice Scalia, either in his more general
argument insisting upon the restricted roster of compelling
governmental interests, or in his revisionist reading of Pasadena.
Indeed, Justice O'Connor's opinion seemed determined to repudiate
Justice Scalia's more extreme interpretation, noting that
the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate
uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a
goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.
The test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this
compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility
that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype.'
174. It at 525 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
175. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)).
176. See Pasadena, 427 U.S. at 434-35.
177. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added). In this portion of the opinion, Justice




In other words, contrary to Justice Scalia's view, Justice
O'Connor implied that there are state goals "important enough to
warrant use" of racial considerations, even though such uses are
subject to strict judicial scrutiny to ferret out "illegitimate" legislative
motives such as "racial prejudice or stereotype."'78
This theme-that strict scrutiny of state decisions employing
racial classifications should not result invariably in their judicial
invalidation-has been reemphasized in several recent cases. For
example, in Adarand, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, sought
to correct the misapprehension that all governmental uses of racial
classifications are forbidden: "[s]trict scrutiny does not 'treat
dissimilar race-based decisions as though they were equally
objectionable ...; to the contrary, it evaluates carefully all
governmental race-based decisions in order to decide which are
constitutionally objectionable and which are not.' "179 By requiring
strict scrutiny of racial classifications, she explained, "we require
courts to make sure that a governmental classification based on race
... is legitimate, before permitting unequal treatment based on race
to proceed."'80 Plainly intending to underscore the point, the Court
added:
Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact." ... The unhappy
persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of
178. Id at 493. To be sure, as Justice O'Connor was explaining the central purpose of
the strict scrutiny standard--"to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant the use of a highly suspect
tool"-she pointed out the "danger of stigmatic harm" that racial classifications often
carry, and observed in passing that "[u]nless they are strictly reserved for remedial
settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority." Id. Although one Ninth
Circuit judge, writing in dissent, has characterized Justice O'Connor's remark as holding
that racial classifications can never be justified except in a remedial context, see Hunter ex
reL Brandt v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (Beezer, J.,
dissenting), other jurists, such as Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, have
declined to read Justice O'Connor's remark in so categorical and sweeping a fashion. See,
e.g., Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[a] judge would be
unreasonable to conclude that no other consideration except a history of discrimination
could ever warrant a discriminatory measure unless every other consideration had been
presented to and rejected by him"). Justice O'Connor's remark was made to explain why
racial classifications are potentially dangerous, since they may promote "notions of racial
inferiority" if not confined to circumstances (such as remedial ones) where no such
inference could properly be drawn. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. Her broader discussion, as I
noted above, implicitly refutes the suggestion that she intended to use Croson as the
chosen vehicle to catalogue definitively all permissible uses of race by government.
179. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 245) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 228.
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racial discrimination against minority groups in this country
is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified
from acting in response to it .... When race-based action is
necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is
within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the "narrow
tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous cases.1 8'
As in Croson, Justice Scalia demurred in Adarand from this
crucial point, insisting that race-conscious classifications should only
be used to afford remedies to the proven victims of the state's own
prior discrimination.'8 On this occasion, Justice Scalia's argument
managed to win agreement from a second Justice, Justice Thomas,
who wrote separately that "government-sponsored racial
discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as
discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. ' '183
Thus far, we have polled only the plurality and majority Justices
in reviewing Croson and Adarand. In both of those cases, however,
all of the dissenters would have recognized a far broader range of
compelling state interests that would justify a state's adoption of race-
conscious policies. For example, Justice Stevens, concurring in
Croson, argued that the Equal Protection Clause should be
interpreted to permit the race-conscious selection of public school
teachers if a "school board had reasonably concluded that an
integrated faculty could provide educational benefits to the entire
student body that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-
white, faculty.""a  Justice Stevens later noted in Adarand that the
majority had neither reached nor decided the question of diversity as
a possible compelling governmental interest: "[t]he proposition that
fostering diversity may provide a sufficient interest to justify such a
program is not inconsistent with the Court's holding today-indeed,
181. Id. at 237 (citation omitted); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 112 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing, in a school desegregation context, that while courts
may prescribe race-conscious remedies only after finding intentional discrimination, "the
representative branches" by contrast have "ample authority to combat racial injustice,"
and once again emphasizing that "it is not true that strict scrutiny [of legislative decisions
that create racial classifications] is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact' ").
182. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
183. Id at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
184. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 512 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that benign race-conscious state actions should not be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, since "[n]o sensible conception of the Government's
constitutional obligation to 'govern impartially,' ... should ignore [the] distinction"
between "a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to
eradicate racial subordination") (citation omitted).
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the question is not remotely presented in this case,... ,,185
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun in
Croson, would have subjected race-conscious state classifications to
no more than "intermediate-level" judicial scrutiny.186 Moreover,
Justice Marshall would have upheld not only the City of Richmond's
goal of remedying prior societal discrimination but also "the
prospective [goal] ... of preventing the city's own spending decisions
from reinforcing and perpetuating the exclusionary effects of past
discrimination."'187
Finally, in Adarand, both Justice Souter, in a dissent joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and Justice Ginsburg, in a dissent
joined by Justice Breyer, voiced support for race-conscious actions by
state and federal governments that would diminish lingering racial
discrimination in the broader society.18
To summarize the analysis thus far, the only direct support for
the view of "[m]odern Supreme Court precedent" upon which the
district court relied in Capacchione '99 has come from two Justices,
Scalia and Thomas, who have never attracted additional support for
their views from any other member of the Court. To the contrary,
their views appear to have been considered and repudiated, not only
by the four more liberal members of the current Court (Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), but also by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist as well, in both
Croson and Adarand.'8 9
Nonetheless, the district court looked to another Supreme Court
case in building its string of "[m]odern Supreme Court precedents": a
dissenting opinion by Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice
185. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
186. Croson, 488 U.S. at 551-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 537 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
188. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 264-71 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 271-76 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
189. After reviewing Croson, Adarand, and other pertinent authorities, Judge Richard
Posner of the Seventh Circuit concluded in 1996 that "[a] judge would be unreasonable to
conclude that no other consideration except of history of discrimination" could warrant
state use of race-conscious measures without first considering the specific circumstances
that presented themselves to state policymakers. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th
Cir. 1996). In Wittmer, the court examined evidence proffered by the State of Illinois that
it had a special need, in staffing prison "boot camps," to select at least some African-
American correctional lieutenants to work with the young, minority inmates. After
assessing that evidence, the Seventh Circuit upheld Illinois's race-conscious selection of an
African-American over other white candidates who scored higher on certain qualifying
tests for the position. Judge Posner expressly held that "the rectification of past
discrimination is not the only setting in which government officials can lawfully take race
into account in making decisions." Id.
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and by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, in the 1990 case Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.90 The five-Justice majority in Metro
Broadcasting upheld the promotion of "programming diversity" as a
sufficiently important governmental end to justify a racial or ethnic
preference in the federal government's awarding or transferring of
certain FCC-supervised broadcasting licenses.' 91 In so doing, the
majority did not apply a strict scrutiny standard, but a lower
"intermediate" standard of review, observing the distinction (drawn
the year before in Croson by Justice O'Connor' 92) between the
broader remedial authority of Congress under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the narrower remedial authority of
states and local governments under Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 93 The majority reasoned that while "strict scrutiny"
was appropriate when a federal court assessed race-conscious action
by a state or local government, greater deference, and hence a lower
standard of judicial scrutiny, was appropriate when assessing
Congressional or FCC action.194
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor strongly objected to any
constitutional distinction between the Equal Protection Clause
standards applicable to the states and to the federal government.19 5
Beyond her disagreement on the standard of review, however, Justice
O'Connor subjected the FCC's justification of "broadcast diversity"
to a withering analytical attack. The heart of her argument was as
follows:
Modern equal protection doctrine has recognized only one
[compelling governmental] interest: remedying the effects
of racial discrimination. The interest in increasing the
diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling
interest. It is simply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and
too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing racial
classifications. The Court does not claim otherwise. Rather,
it employs its novel standard and claims that this asserted
interest need only be, and is, "important" [under
intermediate scrutiny review]. This conclusion twice
190. 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Adarand, 515
U.S. at 227.
191. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 566-68.
192. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 486-91.
193. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563-66.
194. See id. at 565-66.
195. See id. at 602-03. Indeed, five years later in Adarand, Justice O'Connor gained an
additional vote and wrote for a majority that expressly overruled Metro Broadcasting
insofar as it applied a different, lower standard of review to race-conscious actions by
Congress or other federal actors. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226-27.
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compounds the Court's initial error of reducing its level of
scrutiny of a racial classification. First, it too casually
extends the justifications that might support racial
classification, beyond that of remedying past discriminations
.... Second, it has initiated this departure by endorsing an
insubstantial interest ....
The district court in Capacchione almost certainly drew its
generalization about the permissible range of "compelling
governmental interests" from this paragraph. Yet a close reading
defeats the meaning that Capacchione would ascribe to the passage.
Justice O'Connor clearly was not speaking prescriptively here-to set
the outer boundaries of compelling state interest law-but instead
descriptively-to observe that no previous decision of the Court had
recognized a non-remedial interest as compelling. Her descriptive
use appeared even more clearly in her follow-up critique, in which she
lamented that the Metro Broadcasting majority's use of a lower
standard of review allowed the Court to extend "too casually" the
justification for a race-conscious action."9 If Justice O'Connor really
intended to state that only remedial ends could ever be compelling, it
would not have mattered whether the majority's disregard of such a
categorical rule had been casual or deliberate. What evidently
distressed Justice O'Connor was that, by lowering the standard of
review, the majority had entered unfamiliar legal territory-
approving a non-remedial justification for a racial classification-
without the careful consideration that strict scrutiny entails. Justice
O'Connor's repeated and emphatic general insistence in both
Adarand and Croson that other compelling governmental interests do
exist and that they might survive strict scrutiny made it unmistakable
that neither she nor the other Metro Broadcasting dissenters (apart
from Justice Scalia, of course) intended to close the door permanently
on all governmental interests that might justify race-conscious actions
for non-remedial ends. 9 8
196. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 612-13 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 613.
198. Indeed, as early as 1986, Justice O'Connor had already distinguished between
state affirmative action programs whose interest was in "remedying past or present racial
discrimination by a state actor" on the one hand, and "a state['s] interest in the promotion
of racial diversity ... at least in the context of higher education," on the other hand, noting
that both interests had been recognized as compelling under the Court's precedents.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor added that "certainly nothing the
Court has said today necessarily forecloses the possibility that the Court will find other
governmental interests which have been relied upon in the lower courts but which have
not been passed on here to be sufficiently 'important' or 'compelling' to sustain the use of
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Beyond Croson, Adarand, and the sentence from the Metro
Broadcasting dissent (which cannot bear the weight the Capacchione
court intended for it), the authority for the district court's major
premise about "[m]odern Supreme Court precedent" dwindles to a
single Fifth Circuit case, Hopwood v. Texas. 99 To be sure, this
opinion provides solid support for the district court, as Hopwood did
indeed repudiate the use of race in non-remedial settings."' All
would be in order, then, except that Hopwood is not a Supreme Court
decision, nor was it subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court.20 1
It was, instead, a bold departure by a lower federal court that, like
Capacchione, set sail against the winds of prior Supreme Court
precedents-namely Swann, Bustop, and Bakke-with apparent
confidence that it could foresee a future time in which the Court
would revise its former handiwork. In sum, Capacchione '99's
conclusion that educational diversity could never be deemed
"compelling" under the Equal Protection Clause has no substantial
precedential support.m
2. The Unsteady Jurisprudential Foundation
It is perhaps unjustified to judge a court's work solely on the
strength of its string citations. Another venerable jurisprudential
route can lead to a defensible judicial conclusion-the use of
reasoned analogy and principle. If the underlying concerns that
prompted the Supreme Court to reject race-conscious classifications
affirmative actions policies." Id.
199. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
200. See id. at 944.
201. Instead, the Court denied certiorari. See Hopwood v. Texas, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, wrote a brief opinion respecting the denial of
certiorari, emphasizing that, while the use of race by public universities in their admissions
decisions was "an issue of great national importance," Hopwood itself was not a good
vehicle for Supreme Court review, since all parties conceded "that the particular
admissions procedure used by the University of Texas Law School in 1992 was
unconstitutional" and had "'long since been discontinued.'" Id. at 1034 (citation
omitted).
202. Moreover, the Capacchione '99 court failed to address significant adverse
precedent. Beyond the Supreme Court authorities discussed at pages 1739-44 supra, he
district court might have consulted the Fourth Circuit's earlier decision in Riddick v.
School Board, 784 F.2d 521, 543-44 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding the authority of a unitary
school board to take "white flight" into consideration and to adopt a plan relying upon
neighborhood schools with the aim "to keep as many white students in public education as
possible and so achieve a stably integrated school system"). See also Parent Ass'n of
Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 717-21 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that a
race-conscious state student assignment plan, designed to minimize white flight from
public schools, can survive strict scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored to attain the compelling
end of promoting racially integrated public schools).
1762 [Vol. 78
PUBLIC SCHOOL ASSIGNMENTS
in Croson or Adarand likewise apply in Capacchione, then the district
court's decision might be vindicated, if not by precedent, then by an
even worthier and more substantial justification: the congruence
between present circumstances and the rationale that prompted the
Supreme Court's prior decisions.
To evaluate Capacchione on these grounds, it is necessary first to
identify the concerns that have raised the Supreme Court's guard
against the use of race-conscious state classifications. In Croson,
Justice O'Connor identified the following concerns: (1) all citizens'
"'personal rights' to be treated with equal dignity and respect," (2) a
concern about the promotion of "illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority," (3) the prospect that racial classifications would become
an unacceptable form of "simple racial politics," (4) "a danger of
stigmatic harm,' '203 and (5) the prospect of "'reinforc[ing] common
stereotypes.' ,,24 The Croson Court also worried that allowing states
free reign to use racial classifications might "give local governments
license to create a patchwork of racial preferences based on statistical
generalizations about any particular field."2 5 Some variant of these
concerns reappeared in Adarand and Jenkins Ill.
Most of these concerns arise in circumstances when a
government must award a scarce resource to one among several rival
claimants of different races-whether a government construction
contract (Croson, Adarand), a government franchise (Metro
Broadcasting), a seat in a graduate or professional school (Bakke,
Hopwood), a merit-based scholarship (Podberesky v. Kirwan20 6) or a
seat in a competitive-exam high school (Wessmann v. Gittens2°7).
When a state bestows such glittering prizes, it is plausible to reason,
as the district court did in Capacchione, that "' "the use of race as a
reparational device risks perpetuating the very race-consciousness
such a remedy purports to overcome."' ,,12s It seems "unfair" or
"unequal" if such decisions, which ought be based upon worth or
merit-lowest bid, best qualified, most competitive-may have tipped
toward one less qualified or less competitive solely because of his or
203. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
204. Id at 493-94 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298
(1978)).
205. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.
206. 38 F.3d 147,151 (4th Cir. 1994).
207. 160 F.3d 790,791-92 (lstCir. 1998).
208. Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 241
(W.D.N.C. 1999) (quoting Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d
207, 212 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Maryland Troopers Ass'n, Inc. v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072,
1076 (4th Cir. 1993))).
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her race or ethnicity. Under such circumstances, others may sense
that these recipients are actually inferior, and their unspoken
sentiment not only breeds resentment from others but also
stigmatizes those selected on racial grounds.
In contrast, access to second grade teachers or fifth grade
classrooms, in Charlotte and elsewhere, is not a scarce resource but a
"public good."2 9 Every child is sent to school; no child is denied. Of
course, every public elementary and secondary school has its own
special characteristics: its history, its identifying architectural
features, its principal, and its corps of teachers (all with their own
special talents and personality). Yet along with then-Justice
Rehnquist in Bustop, let me observe that there is no "federal right"
granted any parent or child that assures attendance at any particular
public school.21 0 For legal purposes, public schools are deemed
equivalent and fungible, and to that extent, at least, our law normally
recognizes no "winners" or "losers" in the distribution of public
school resources.2 n Significantly, a child's assignment to a particular
elementary school does not stigmatize in the ways that worried
Justice O'Connor in Adarand and Croson, because the criteria for
assignment do not reflect upon the character of students or their
ability to perform.212
209. See generally JAMES A. CAPORASO & DAVID P. LEVINE, THEORIES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 93-95 (1992) (explaining that neoclassical economists have
identified some goods and services, such as education and public roads, as "public goods,"
that "seem so important that they are provided, with varying degrees of success, by nearly
all countries").
210. See, e.g., In re United States ex rel. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 682
F.2d 147, 152 (8th Cir. 1982) (observing that "[s]tudents have no indefeasible right to
associate through choice of school," and that "[m]andatory assignment to public schools
based on place of residence or other factors is clearly permissible"); Wharton v. Abbeville
Sch. Dist. No. 60, 608 F. Supp. 70, 76 (D.S.C. 1984) (noting that plaintiffs in that school
desegregation case had "presented no independent source, either in the law of South
Carolina, or otherwise, which has granted to them a legitimate claim of entitlement to
attend a particular school"); Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 495 P.2d
657, 663 (Wash. 1972) (finding "no authority in law for the proposition that parents have a
vested right to send their children to, or that children have a vested right to attend, any
particular school"); cf. Bronson v. Board of Educ., 550 F. Supp. 941, 958 (S.D. Ohio 1982)
(noting that "Ohio law ... does not confer a right upon pupils to attend a specific school,
even if they were previously assigned thereto"); see also authorities cited in note 274.
211. As Chief Judge Wilkinson wrote, "[i]n drafting attendance plans, school boards
have always been free to deny parental preference for any one of a hundred reasons ....
[O]nce a child is in a public school, the parent cannot dictate what teacher he gets, what
courses he takes, what grades he receives, or what discipline he meets." WILKINSON,
supra note 22, at 109.
212. Interestingly, the Capacchione parents did not agree on what educational
assignments they desired for their children. For example, William Capacchione sought for
his daughter to attend a magnet school located farther from her home than the
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Some recent cases have involved the use of racial criteria in the
context of special "merit schools," i.e., public schools where
admission is normally predicated on objective indicia of excellence.
The First Circuit's recent decision in Wessmann v. Gittens213 offers
perhaps the greatest support for the district court's position, and it
understandably became a source of special reliance 14  Wessmann
involved admission to Boston Latin, where access is reserved for
students who score the highest on competitive merit examinations.
The First Circuit's decision in that context merely assured that when
school boards operate special schools with the goal of nurturing
exceptional talent, no child should be deprived of a place earned on
the merits because of racial considerations-even to further diversity
ends. Typical student assignments to public schools, by contrast, are
not made on the basis of merit, and, therefore, Wessmann's logic
simply does not extend to those routine choices. 15
Indeed, school boards are well aware that while teachers are one
important educational resource for achieving the school's mission,
fellow students are another. As the world grows more racially and
neighborhood school to which she had been assigned. See Debbie Cenziper, Parents Clash
on School Policies: Mecklenburg Parents Group, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Apr. 11, 1999,
at 5B. By contrast, parent Karen Bentley preferred a neighborhood school for her
daughter, even though she had elected to send her daughter to a magnet school rather
than risk possible future reassignment if her daughter had decided to attend their local
neighborhood school. A third parent, Michael Grant, complained that, although his son
did manage to attend the magnet school of his choice, "other [minority] elementary school
kids that came in were not as prepared, so [his son's] classes were slowed down with these
other students trying to get them up to the same level" as his son. Id Hence, each of
these three plaintiff parents expected something different from a victory in Capacchione.
One wanted his daughter to attend a magnet school; a second wanted her son to attend a
neighborhood school and be assured that he would not be reassigned; and the third
wanted to assure himself that children not "up to the same level" as his son would not be
admitted to his son's magnet school.
213. 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
214. See Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 291-92
(W.D.N.C. 1999) (citing Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 796-809).
215. Indeed, one federal district court-responding to a broad legal challenge against
the Boston School Committee's use of race as a factor in creating school attendance zones
and in assigning children-has recently emphasized the special circumstances of the
Wessmann decision and the different considerations that might plausibly govern judicial
review of student assignments to most of Boston's elementary schools, "for which there
are no qualifications other than residency." Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 62
F. Supp. 2d 247, 259 (D. Mass. 1999). The court observed that when school boards assign
students to such schools,"[d]iversity may well be more important at this stage than at any
other," adding that "[k]indergarten is when first friendships are formed and important
attitudes shaped" and that in such school assignments, there were not "any countervailing
concerns about merit," unlike "Wessmann [which] involved an examination secondary
school." Id.
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ethnically interdependent every year, reasonable educators might
well conclude that every child has a compelling interest in learning
more about children of other racial and ethnic backgrounds. From
that exposure, children can see for themselves the role that racial
background plays (or very often, does not play) in prompting a child
to respond to good literature, to think about civic issues, to work in
groups, and to create new solutions for contemporary problems.
Indeed, the pedagogical objective in assuring racially diverse
classrooms seems founded not upon some chimerical stereotype
about what African-American children think or how Latino children
behave, but on precisely the opposite view-that all children share
many more things in common than they do differences and that the
best device for overcoming lingering racial suspicions or prejudices is
exposure, not separation. These pedagogical choices rest upon a
large body of social scientific evidence, conducted in the past two
decades, that directly addresses and confirms the educational
desirability of integrated schooling.2 16
216. See, e.g., James M. McPartland & Jomills Henry Braddock II, Going to College
and Getting a Good Job: The Impact of Desegregation, in EFFECrIVE SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION: EQUITY, QUALITY, AND FEASIBILITY 141,152 (Willis D. Hawley ed.,
1981) (noting the positive long-term effects on the occupational status and interracial life
choices of persons who have attended desegregated public schools); James E. Rosenbaum
et al., Can the Kerner Commission's Housing Strategy Improve Employment, Education,
and Social Integration for Low-Income Blacks? in RACE, POVERTY, & AMERICAN
CITIES, supra note 23, at 273, 300 (concluding that minority children who move from
segregated Chicago city schools to integrated suburban Chicago schools are subsequently
"more likely to be (1) in school, (2) in college-track classes, (3) in four-year colleges, (4)
employed, and (5) employed in jobs with benefits and better pay"); Janet W. Schofield,
Promoting Positive Peer Relations in Desegregated Schools, in BEYOND
DESEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF QUALITY IN AFRICAN AMERICAN SCHOOLING 91,
93 (Mwalimu J. Shujaa ed., 1996) (noting that public schools present many children with
the opportunity to experience their first and only public or private interracial
experiences); Janet W. Schofield, Review of Research on School Desegregation's Impact on
Elementary and Secondary School Students, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 597, 610 (James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGee Banks
eds., 1995) (finding significant reductions in racial stereotyping, reduced interracial
anxieties, and positive responses to interracial vocational settings among adults who have
attended racially integrated schools); Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation
Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 REV. EDUC. RES. 531,
541-52 (1994) (concluding that desegregated educational experiences lead to significant
improvements in the higher educational attainment, employment success, and residential
community choice of minority students).
Moreover, credible evidence suggests that desegregated settings not only improve
the social interaction of students but may lead to higher academic achievement as well.
See Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score Gap: An
Introduction, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 1, 9, 26, 31 (Christopher Jencks &
Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) (reporting extensive research findings which suggest that
"[d]esegregation seems to have pushed up southern blacks' [school test] scores a little
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The Capacchione '99 court conceded as much, noting "that
children may derive benefits from encounters with students of
different races. 217 Moreover, the school board presented evidence
demonstrating that if it switched to a race-blind, proximity-based
assignment plan, seventy-one percent of Charlotte-Mecklenburg's
elementary schools become racially identifiable and nineteen of these
schools would be more than seventy-five percent black.2 18 Overall,
the school board estimated, these changes would cause "the absolute
level of segregation in [Charlotte-Mecklenburg] schools to double." 219
Yet the court described the school board's "single-minded focus on
racial diversity" as "a major problem" and called for students to be
viewed as individuals, not "as cogs in a social experimentation
machine."' 0  Then with perfect assurance, in defense of a
constitutional principle found nowhere in the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment-indeed, interpreting that amendment contrary to the
expectations of many of its Framers 2--the court opted to impose its
own policy preferences in derogation of this substantial body of
empirical evidence, solemnly forbidding school board members from
implementing policies that, after much deliberation and debate, they
determined to be necessary to further compelling educational ends.
No analogy seems more apt than that to Justice Peckham, in Lochner
without affecting whites either way"); Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain, Research on
Minority Achievement in Desegregated Schools, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 103, 103-25 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983)
(finding that desegregated public school experiences that begin in the early grades led to
significant, though modest, improvements in tests scores of minority students).
217. Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 291.
218. See Brief of Appellants Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ. at 29, Belk v.




221. In the spring of 1866, the 39th Congress adopted the Equal Protection Clause as
part of its approval of the larger Fourteenth Amendment and simultaneously passed a
Freedman's Bureau Act that authorized the activities of a federal agency that was devoted
to the distribution of an extraordinary variety of federal benefits on explicitly racial
grounds. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCrION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REvOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 239-61 (1988) (describing the concurrent struggles in
Congress during 1866 to shape the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Freedmen's Bureau Act,
and the Fourteenth Amendment); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985) (describing the
variety of post-Civil War federal "social welfare programs whose benefits were expressly
limited to blacks," which "were enacted concurrently with the fourteenth amendment ...
by the same legislators who favored the constitutional guarantee of equal protection," and
which therefore strongly suggest that those Framers "could not have intended [the Equal
Protection Clause] to prohibit affirmative action for blacks or other disadvantaged
groups").
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v. New York t -- invoking inscrutable, inflexible, high-minded
principles to forbid elected representatives from implementing their
own best judgments (for which they will be fully answerable at the
polls) as they wrestle with serious contemporary social challenges.
III. TUTTLE, EISENBERG, AND EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY: THE
ODD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN "COMPELLING STATE ENDS" AND
PERMISSIBLE MEANS
A. Tuttle and Eisenberg in the District Courts
When the Capacchione '99 appeal arrives at the Fourth Circuit, it
will find two freshly minted precedents, both closely related to the
Charlotte case on their facts and legal issues. In the first, Tuttle v.
Arlington County School Board,2 decided on September 24, 1999,
parents challenged an Arlington County, Virginia school board policy
of assigning students by weighted lottery to three public schools. 4
The parents were unhappy that their children had not been assigned
to the Alternative Traditional School; they invoked the Equal
Protection Clause and sought to enjoin the school board's use of race
to assign "weights" to lottery participants as one of three qualifying
criteria. The school board's express reason for employing the
weighted lottery was "to obtain a student body 'in proportions that
approximate the distribution of students from those groups in the
district's overall student population.' "22
In earlier years, the Arlington school board employed other
race-conscious student assignment policies to comply with a court
order entered in a desegregation lawsuit. 6  The new admissions
procedure challenged in Tuttle, however, did not rely on any remedial
justification; the school board expressly identified two other goals:
(1) "to prepare and educate students to live in a diverse,
global society" by "reflect[ing] the diversity of the
222. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
223. 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), cer dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).
224. See id. at 700-01. Specifically at issue in Tuttle was the admission program in the
Alternative Traditional School (ATS), a public kindergarten.
225. Id. (citation omitted). The other two factors were whether children were from
"low-income or special family background[s]" and whether their families spoke English as
a first or a second language. Id. at 701. The full details of the policy are not germane to
this discussion. In general, the policy gave some initial preference to the siblings of
children already attending ATS. Only if the overall student population departed by at
least 15% from the county-wide student population on all three of the weighted factors
was a lottery instituted. See id. at 702.
226. See Hart v. County Sch. Bd., 459 F.2d 981, 982 (4th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
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community" and (2) to help the School Board "serve the
diverse groups of students in the district, including those
from backgrounds that suggest they may come to school with
educational needs that are different from or greater than
others." 7
The federal district court ruled that the school board's policy failed
strict scrutiny review, reasoning that diversity does not constitute a
compelling governmental interest because only remedial racial
classifications are compelling.'
The second Fourth Circuit case, Eisenberg v. Montgomery
County Public Schools, 9 was decided on October 6, 1999. At issue
was the district's transfer policy. That policy assessed all student
requests for a transfer using four factors-one of which was the
"diversity profile" of the potential sending and receiving schools. 30
The diversity profile embraced not only the race and ethnicity of the
requesting student, but also the racial and ethnic composition of the
potential sending and receiving schools (relative to the overall
composition of the district school population), as well as whether the
percentage of each racial or ethnic group in each school had either
increased or decreased over time31
The case began after the plaintiff, Jeffrey Eisenberg, requested
that his son be transferred from his assigned first grade school (an
assignment based upon the parents' residence), to a "science and
math magnet school." 2  Eisenberg urged that his son's " 'personal
and academic potential' would benefit from the magnet school's math
and science emphasis."'' The Montgomery County, Maryland school
board denied his request, explaining that his son's assigned school
had a student population that was only twenty-four percent white,
which was substantially below the countywide white student
percentage of fifty-three percent. Moreover, during the preceding
227. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 701 (quoting the Arlington County School Board's policy of
using a weighted lottery to promote diversity in its schools).
228. See id. at 703 (quoting the district court's unpublished memorandum opinion in
Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., No. 98-418-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22578, at *8
(E.D. Va. April 14, 1998)).
229. 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000). For a general
overview of Montgomery County's school desegregation history and its current policies,
see Susan E. Eaton, Slipping Toward Segregation: Local Control and Eroding
Desegregation in Montgomery County, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 19,
at 207-39.
230. Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 126.
231. See id. at 126-27.
232. Id. at 125.
233. Id. at 127.
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three years, the white enrollment at the Eisenberg child's assigned
school had fallen from nearly thirty-nine percent to twenty-four
percent. His transfer would have further decreased the white
enrollment, thus adversely affecting the overall racial diversity of the
school.2m
Eisenberg sued, contending that the transfer policy violated the
Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
Montgomery County school board did not offer any remedial defense
of its transfer policy because the district had never been subject to a
school desegregation decree.Y35 The district court denied Eisenberg's
motion for injunctive relief and compensatory damages, reasoning
that the county's interests in promoting diversity among students and
avoiding segregative enrollment patterns were sufficiently compelling
to satisfy strict scrutiny. 6 Eisenberg thereafter appealed to the
Fourth Circuit.
In sum, school boards in both Tuttle and Eisenberg used race-
conscious policies that directly affected student assignment decisions.
Both school boards justified their policies by contending that a
diverse student body was a state interest sufficiently compelling to
survive strict judicial scrutiny. One district court rejected that
argument; another district court accepted it.
B. "Diversity" as a Compelling State Interest: The Uncertain State of
Current Federal Law
Unlike the district court in Capacchione '99, neither of the two
Fourth Circuit panels that heard and decided these related appeals
was willing to hold that "diversity of a student body" is not a
compelling state interest. The Tuttle panel explained that "[t]his
question remains unresolved" for three reasons. 7 First, only the
Fifth Circuit in Hopwood had definitively addressed the issue.
Second, all cases examined by Tuttle were distinguishable because
they had focused on programs designed to remedy past
234. See id.
235. See id. at 125 n.2. Montgomery County had voluntarily desegregated its racially
segregated school system in the 1970s. In 1981, a parent complained to the Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) of the Department of Education that the board was allowing certain
schools to become racially isolated. Although the complaint never resulted in any
executive or judicial action, the transfer policy challenged in Eisenberg was instituted in
response to that 1981 OCR complaint. See id.
236. See id. at 128 (citing Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 19 F. Supp. 2d
449,453-54 (D. Md. 1998)).
237. Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board, 195 F.3d 698, 704 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).
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discrimination. Third, "[t]he only applicable Supreme Court
precedent is Justice Powell's concurrence in Bakke, where Justice
Powell wrote that diversity 'furthers a compelling state interest.' "238
The Tuttle panel therefore went on to "assume, without so holding,
that diversity may be a compelling governmental interest."239
The Eisenberg panel made a similar assumption, although
somewhat more reluctantly.240 Eisenberg, however, refused to accept
238. Id. at 705. The Tuttle panel noted that the Fourth Circuit had previously
interpreted Bakke to hold that a "state 'is not absolutely barred from giving any
consideration to race' in a non-remedial context." Id. at 705 (quoting Talbert v. City of
Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 928 (4th Cir. 1981)).
One circuit judge, writing in a dissenting opinion, purported to identify six circuits
that "have definitively held that racial classifications may only be used for the purpose of
remedying racial discrimination." Hunter ex rel Brandt v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 190
F.3d 1061, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 1999) (Beezer, J., dissenting) (citing Contractors Ass'n v. City
of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586, 596 (3d Cir. 1996); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th
Cir. 1996); Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (6th Cir. 1994); In re
Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 20 F.3d 1525, 1544 (11th Cir.
1994); O'Donnell Const. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52, 56 (4th Cir. 1992)). A careful review of these cases,
however, substantiates the Tuttle panel's more cautious assessment.
239. Tuttle, 195 F.3d. at 705. The version of the opinion that originally appeared on
September 24, 1999 and was reported by electronic reporting services contained one
significant footnote (denominated as footnote 10) that was later omitted in a "corrected
opinion" filed on November 1, 1999. In the original version, after announcing that the
panel would "assume, without so holding, that diversity may be a compelling
governmental interest," id. at 705, the panel added the following as footnote 10:
Although we leave the question of whether diversity is a compelling state
interest unanswered, we observe that the diversity sought by the School
Board in the present case is distinguishable from the diversity sought in
previous cases. Unlike previous cases which concerned diversity in higher
education or employment, this case concerns diversity in public
elementary schools. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("the attainment of a a diverse student body ... clearly is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education")
(emphasis added); Hayes, 10 F.3d at 213 (stating that the court for not
deciding "whether achieving a greater racial diversity within the police
department is a compelling state interest that might justify awarding
promotions on the basis of race") (emphasis added); see also Note, The
Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions Programs in Public
Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 940 (1999).
Id. (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999), available at <http://laws.findlaw.com/4th/ 981604p.html> (copy
on file with North Carolina Law Review).
This omitted footnote 10 appears to underscore a potential constitutional
distinction between the higher education or employment context, on the one hand, and
the elementary and secondary school context on the other. (It is unclear whether Judge
Ervin-to whom the per curiam opinion is attributed in the opening footnote, see 195 F.3d
at 700 n.1 (stating that "[t]he opinion in this case was prepared by Judge Ervin, who died
before it was filed")-acquiesced in the removal of footnote 10 before his death).
240. See Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130 (emphasizing that "[n]o inference may here be
taken that we are of the opinion that racial diversity is a compelling governmental
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the Montgomery board's contention that it had a second compelling
interest-"avoiding racial isolation" of its schools.241  Following a
recent New York district court decision242 (that has since been
vacated and remanded on appeal),243 the Eisenberg panel insisted that
"despite the different nomenclature," this interest was "one and the
same" as that in racial diversity.244
The Eisenberg panel took one other position that deserves
special note. At the outset of its analysis, it faulted the district court
for failing to "adhere to, or even to mention, the presumption against
race based classifications," adding that "Montgomery County was
burdened with this presumption, and although the district court
analyzed the transfer policy under strict scrutiny review, it failed to
take the presumption into account when it denied [the student's]
request for a preliminary injunction. There is nothing in the record to
overcome this presumption.2'4I The remark is baffling. Never before
has the Supreme Court (or any circuit or district court to my
knowledge) suggested that, in addition to surmounting the formidable
barriers erected by the strict scrutiny test-proof of both a compelling
governmental interest and a narrowly tailored means-a state actor
interest").
241. Id. at 130.
242. See Brewer v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627
(W.D.N.Y. 1999).
243. See Brewer v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000)
(vacating the district court's injunction and remanding for a full trial with the strong
suggestion that the district's goal of ending racial isolation because of residential
segregation may constitute a compelling state interest).
244. Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130. The Montgomery County school board had adopted
the transfer policy, at least in part, to forestall complaints from minority parents that some
schools in the district were becoming racially isolated under the school board's voluntary
desegregation plan. Indeed, a letter, dated February 28, 1981, from the United States
Department of Education (DOE) to the Montgomery County Superintendent, recited the
DOE's understanding that the school board would allow transfers, "'providing that the
transfer does not adversely affect the racial balance in either the sending or the receiving
school.' "Id. at 131 (quoting the DOE letter). To suggest that a state policy prompted by
the threat of adverse federal executive action is "one and the same" as a voluntary policy
to encourage student diversity misses an essential difference in the motivations of the two.
The collapsing of the two distinct interests may not matter in this instance,
however. The Supreme Court held in Miller v. Johnson, that it would not accept as
"compelling" for Equal Protection Clause purposes Georgia's decision to comply with
certain redistricting mandates prescribed by the United States Department of Justice
under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995). The Court
reasoned that the judicial branch had an independent constitutional obligation to assure
that states do not violate the Equal Protection Clause and that to suggest that federal
executive agency mandates create a "compelling state interest" could impermissibly
insulate states' race-base classifications from judicial review. Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130.
245. Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 128-29 (emphasis added).
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must overcome yet a third barrier, "the presumption against race
based classifications," which apparently can be overcome only by the
proffer of some unstated quantum of evidence. Whether this
statement actually represents an innovation in Equal Protection
jurisprudence within the Fourth Circuit or was meant instead as an
emphatic reminder of the seriousness with which district courts
should undertake strict scrutiny review is unclear.
C. The Errant Search for "Narrowly Tailored Means" to Implement
Diversity Ends
While both Fourth Circuit panels assumed that the school boards
had implemented their policies to further a compelling interest in
educational diversity, they concluded, nonetheless, that the policies
failed strict scrutiny because they were not narrowly tailored. In
determining whether Arlington County's means were sufficiently
narrow, the Tuttle panel looked to the five "narrow tailoring" criteria
identified by the Supreme Court in United States v. Paradise246 and
employed by the Fourth Circuit in Hayes v. North State Law
Enforcement Officers Assn:247
(1) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral policies; (2) the
planned duration of the policy; (3) the relationship between
the numerical goal and the percentage of minority group
members in the relevant population or work force; (4) the
flexibility of the policy, including the provision of waivers if
the goal cannot be met; and (5) the burden of the policy on
innocent third parties. 48
The court assessed Arlington's assignment policies in light of
each of these five factors. The Tuttle court began its search for more
narrowly tailored alternatives by agreeing with Justice Blackmun's
observation in Bakke that "'the judiciary ... is ill-equipped and
poorly trained ' " to evaluate" '[t]he administration and management
of educational institutions.' "249 Then, with a sense of evident relief,
the panel noted that a local school committee, charged by the
Arlington school board to study admissions policies, had already
identified at least one alternative race-neutral policy. At that point,
246. 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
247. 10 F.3d 207,216 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171
(1987)).
248. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000) (quoting Hayes, 10 F.3d at 216 (1993)).
249. Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 404 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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the panel cut short its analysis, concluding that the committee's
alternative proposal "demonstrate[d] that the School Board ha[d]
race-neutral means to promote diversity," and, therefore, that the
board's chosen policy was not sufficiently narrowly tailoredIO
The Tuttle panel stopped too soon; in Paradise, the Supreme
Court made clear that when pursuing this first "efficacy" prong of the
"narrow tailoring" requirement, a court's analysis is not over after it
identifies another possible means of meeting the state actor's
compelling end. A court must also "examine the purposes the
[challenged school policy] was intended to serve" and determine
whether alternatives means would equally or better serve those
purposes." Indeed, in Paradise itself, the Supreme Court rejected
arguments by the State of Alabama that other proposed alternatives
would suffice, finding them "inadequate because [they] failed to
address" some of the compelling ends identified in the opinionP2
Moreover, the Paradise Court admonished that it had not "in all
situations 'required remedial plans to be limited to the least
restrictive means of implementation .... [T]he choice of remedies to
redress racial discrimination is "a balancing process." '' "I'
Significantly, the Tuttle court failed to carry out this required second
"balancing" step of the "efficacy" analysis, assuming instead that the
mere identification of some alternative to the Arlington school
board's chosen policy would be sufficient.
The Tuttle panel next considered the "planned duration of the
[p]olicy" instituted by the Arlington school board.' Quoting Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Croson, the court first proposed as an
250. Id. at 706 & n.11. In footnote 11, the panel recited the alternatives that had been
mentioned by the school committee, but it made no independent assessment of their
effectiveness in promoting diversity.
251. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171-73.
252. Id. at 172.
253. Id. at 184 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (quoting Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 794 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part))); see also Boston's Children First v. City of
Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247, 259 (D. Mass. 1999):
Assuming that diversity can be a compelling interest,... determining whether
the Plan at issue is narrowly tailored to accomplish it pivots not merely on the
fact that race is used in a school plan, but how it is used, in what settings, for
what purposes, whether it is race conscious or race preferential, whether it
involves an examination school (or a college or law school) for which there are
significant qualifications, or an elementary school, for which there are not,
whether the use of race excludes entirely or simply affects the distribution of a
benefit, whether it is flexible, etc.
Id.
254. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706.
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invariable rule that "a racial classification cannot continue in
perpetuity but must have a 'logical stopping point,'" and then
concluded that the Arlington policy was not narrowly tailored
because it was of indefinite duration1 5  Once again, the Fourth
Circuit avoided careful reflection on the purpose of the criterion,
which teaches that a federal court must take seriously both the
importance of the state's ends and the tailoring of its means. As the
panel put it in Hayes, "the use of racial preferences must be limited so
that they do not outlast their need.' '1 56 In Croson (as well as in Hayes
and Paradise, the other two cases cited by the panel), the end was the
remediation of prior discrimination, and the most effective means
were temporary quotas to bring the contracting, promotion, and
hiring numbers back into racial parity. When temporary means are in
order, a court may logically insist upon some stopping place.
The Arlington school board's compelling interest, on the other
hand, was to create a diverse student population in each school, not
for remedial purpose, nor to reward or punish any student, but
because the board believed that diversity is an indispensable means to
adequately educate all children in a heterogeneous, multi-racial
nation. That need is not short-term but long-term, extending at least
as long as different races and ethnic groups maintain any separate
cultural and social identity."7 The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that
the Arlington policy was not narrowly tailored because it lacked a
short-term "sunset clause" failed to take seriously the distinctive and
important nature of the state's interest. In sum, when considering
race-conscious ends that are remedial, a fixed duration makes good
sense. But in meeting non-remedial, prospective ends-such as
creating racially diverse classrooms-insistence upon a fixed duration
makes no sense1 8
The third consideration, one that seemed important to the Tuttle
255. 1& (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,498 (1989)).
256. Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 216 (4th Cir.
1993) (emphasis added).
257. See WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 303-04 (commenting with approval on Justice
Powell's choice of diversity as the "most acceptable public rationale" in Bakke, contrasting
its forward-looking perspective with remedial or compensatory rationales, and observing
that, at least in education, "the need for diversity will continue forever, as long as race
matters to men").
258. The panel acknowledged that "'these factors are particularly difficult to assess
where, as here, the Policy is not tied to identified past discrimination.'" Tuttle, 195 F.3d at
706 (quoting Hayes, 10 F.3d at 216 n.8). Yet it did not take the next step to distinguish
when the non-remedial setting should make a difference in deciding whether and how the
factors should be applied.
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panel and was all but dispositive for the Eisenberg panel,259 is the
notion that "what drives the entire ... process ... is racial
balancing."2" For the Tuttle panel, that identification alone seemed
enough to condemn the Arlington policy without further analysis or
citation. In comparison, the Eisenberg panel did cite several cases
that purportedly condemned racial balancing, including Pasadena
City Board of Education v. Spangler26' and Freeman v. Pitts.2 2 Yet
those prior cases did not condemn racial balancing generally, but only
racial balancing ordered by federal courts. As noted earlier, Swann
distinguished between the limited authority of federal courts to order
racial balancing as a remedy for a proven constitutional violation and
the "broad power" of school boards not under court supervision "to
formulate and implement educational polic[ies that] might well
[include] ... a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting
the proportion for the district as a whole."263 Thus, the Fourth Circuit
once again mischaracterized crucial precedents. 264 The proposition
that federal courts are not permitted to order racial balancing and the
collateral proposition that school authorities are not required to do so
provide no logical support for the panel's conclusion that school
authorities are forbidden to adopt a racial balancing plan.
The Eisenberg panel's reliance upon Freeman v. Pitts is likewise
misplaced. Freeman held that federal courts cannot order judicial
remedies if racial imbalance in a district is the result of "private
choices" and demographic shifts. 265  Freeman did not, however,
259. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 131 (4th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000) ("[W]e find that [the Montgomery County transfer
policy] is mere racial balancing in a pure form."); id. at 133 ("In Tuttle... and Podberesky
v. Kirwan ... we... held that racial balancing was not a narrowly tailored remedy.").
260. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 707; Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 131-32.
261. 427 U.S. 424,436 (1976).
262. 503 U.S. 467,497-98 (1992).
263. Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
264. Careful review reveals that Spangler relied heavily upon Swann's language and
reasoning. On the specific page of Spangler to which the Eisenberg panel cited, the
Supreme Court noted only that "'[n]either school authorities nor district courts are
constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of
student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished.'"
Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 132 (citing Spangler, 427 U.S. at 436 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at
31-32) (emphasis added)).
265. The Eisenberg panel quoted Justice Kennedy's opinion in Freeman for the
proposition that racial imbalance that is the product of "private choices ... does not have
constitutional implications." 197 F.3d at 132 (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495). The very
next sentence in Freeman, however, clarifies that the Court was addressing the limits of
judicial authority and did not purport to limit school board discretion. The quotation in
full reads: "Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it
does not have constitutional implications. It is beyond the authority and beyond the
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purport to address or limit the authority of school boards themselves
to address those imbalances if they choose to do so voluntarily.
The Tuttle panel turned next to the fourth of its five "narrow
tailoring" factors: the flexibility of the district's race-conscious
policy.266 The panel compared Justice Powell's comment approving
Harvard's use of race as merely a "plus" factor in reviewing its
application plan-when the school was still "treat[ing] each applicant
as an individual"-with his disapproving comment on the University
of California at Davis Medical School admissions plan, which, like the
Arlington weighted policy, did "not treat applicants as individuals. 267
The difference between both the Harvard plan and the University of
California at Davis plan on the one hand, and the Arlington weighted
lottery on the other, however, is that the former plans are designed
for institutions of higher education which must regularly sort among
thousands of potential applicants, each of whom hopes to become one
of a very few accepted for admission, while the latter plan, the
Arlington lottery, allocates students to elementary and secondary
schools with the assurance that all children will receive an educational
opportunity. A public university's failure to consider an applicant's
high school or undergraduate grades, her recommendations, her
extra-curricular activities, or her standardized test scores, might
implicate both Equal Protection and Due Process Clause concerns.
By contrast, elementary school students are not routinely "treated as
individuals" when being assigned to public schools. There is normally
no pretense that particular students' abilities or interests are weighed
or evaluated. Traditionally, residential location has dictated the
school a student attends. District lines are adjusted every few years,
often by dividing streets and neighborhoods in ways that would be
judged truly arbitrary if assessed in terms of the needs or interests of
each child on each street. Yet because school districts promise a
system of common public schools, available to all, their schools are
legally fungible, and students are deployed to different schools at the
discretion of the school board.268
practical ability of the federal courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and
massive demographic shifts." Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added).
266. See Tuttle v. Arlington County Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 1999),
cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).
267. Id.
268. See MD. CODE. ANN., EDUC. § 4-109(c) (1999) (authorizing the school board to
"determine the geographical attendance area for each school"); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-79
(Michie 2000) (authorizing the school board to provide for "redistricting of school
boundaries and to adopt pupil assignment plans"); see also Borders v. Board of Educ., 290
A.2d 510, 514 n.1 (Md. 1972) (acknowledging that the then-current statute, MD. ANN.
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Of course, if a school board institutes a public merit school for
students with exceptional needs or abilities, it normally undertakes
individualized consideration of potential applicants, and the concerns
voiced in Bakke begin to outweigh the school board's need for
unilateral authority. Neither Tuttle's weighted lottery plan for
magnet schools nor Eisenberg's transfer plan, however, purported to
assess individual merit.
The final factor the Tuttle panel considered was "the burden on
innocent third parties" whom the panel depicted as "young
kindergarten-age children."269  The panel found it ironic that the
Arlington board "seeks to teach young children to view people as
individuals rather than members of certain racial and ethnic groups
[and yet it] classifies those same children as members of certain racial
and ethnic groups."270 I contend that the Arlington board's policy
created no such irony. What students learn from each other when
they arrive at school is neither limited to, nor constrained by, the
considerations that have brought them together. Schools may, and
do, deliberately mix together students with different characteristics,
including academic ability, gender identity, and family background.
The use of these categories in assigning students does not lead
students invariably to think of other students only in the categories
used to conjoin them. When assigning students to school, school
boards regularly consider what mix of students might create the best
or most balanced learning environment. In fact, schools have
considered such questions at every academic level from time
immemorial. It is simply not true that the deliberate use of racial
classifications will necessarily lead students to think of their
classmates only in racial or ethnic terms.
After completing its review of the five "narrow tailoring" factors,
the Tuttle panel struck down the policy because it was not narrowly
tailored to further diversity.27 The Eisenberg panel's conclusion was
CODE art. 77, § 42 (1957), empowered "the county board of education ... [to] determine
the geographical attendance areas for all such schools" and therefore rejecting a challenge
by parents who argued that redrawing attendance lines was impermissible. The decision
declared that the "courts will not attempt to substitute their judgment for the expertise of
school boards, acting within the limits of the discretion entrusted to them."). The court in
Borders relied upon the Annotated Code of Maryland, article 77, section 42 of 1957, which
was subsequently repealed and re-enacted in 1996 and is now codified as Maryland Code
Annotated, Education section 4-109(c). The successor statute is substantively the same as
the earlier one relied upon in Borders; it simply re-authorizes the school board to
determine the geographical attendance zones for each school.
269. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 707.
270. Id.
271. See id. The panel did consider and vacate the injunction entered by the district
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more expansive. It literally locked the schoolhouse door to future use
of a student's race within the Fourth Circuit and threw away the key:
Montgomery County's transfer policy ... is engaging in
racial balancing, which we have just held to be
unconstitutional in Tuttle. In Tuttle ... and Podberesky v.
Kirwan ... we also held that racial balancing was not a
narrowly tailored remedy. Therefore .... the complained of
action on the part of Montgomery County [must] be
invalidated because it [gave] effect to an unconstitutional
policy.
2 72
Beyond the panels' imperfect reliance upon the five "narrow
tailoring" factors-some misapprehended, others misapplied, and still
others inapplicable in the school diversity context-the more
fundamental failure of the Fourth Circuit was its neglect of the
deeper questions about narrower tailoring. An adequate judicial
analysis would require serious attention to the tailoring of a school
board's policy, not in the abstract, but in relation to the concrete state
ends the court has already deemed compelling. Thus, narrow
tailoring analysis requires consideration of two compound questions:
(1) What is compelling about this particular choice, and why has the
state deemed the classification to be necessary? and (2) Who, if
anyone, will be injured by this choice, and has the state attempted to
minimize such injuries to the fullest extent compatible with achieving
its compelling interest?
The two Fourth Circuit panels, after reluctantly assuming that
school diversity was a compelling interest, grudgingly conducted
"narrow tailoring" reviews. Yet if achieving diversity in local school
populations is a valid (a legitimate, an important, even a compelling)
governmental interest, why can school boards not proceed to
implement that end in the most direct and logical way-by assigning
children to assure that every school will reflect racial and ethnic
diversity? The Fourth Circuit's best answer or non-answer seems to
be that school boards may achieve racial diversity if they do so
indirectly, relying on non-racial assignment factors.
Yet that answer betrays an underlying conceptual
misunderstanding. If a school board does employ other, non-racial
court, holding that, rather than requiring a particular alternative assignment policy, "[t]he
district court should have taken the less intrusive step of continuing to monitor and review
alternative programs proposed by the School Board" during an evidentiary hearing. Id. at
708.
272. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 133 (4th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000).
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factors but fails to achieve racial and ethnic diversity in its schools (or
indeed, in any one school), may it try again? One who answers no
must explain why a state interest, admittedly compelling, can
nonetheless be thwarted. It is untenable for federal courts to
recognize a state interest as compelling, yet refuse to allow the state
sufficient means to achieve it. On the other hand, if school boards
may try again, presumably they may be permitted to try a succession
of methods, one after another, until they find one that succeeds in
achieving racial diversity. Repeated tries and misses would, however,
raise the specter of Washington v. Davis,273 for such school boards'
actions, although facially neutral, would obviously be taken with the
intent to bring about a race-specific end. Yet this brings us full circle,
for if a school board may permissibly adopt and seek school diversity
as a race-conscious goal, why is it impermissible to take the direct
route rather than insist upon an administratively cumbersome,
analytically dubious, indirect path?
The best, though unsatisfying, answer may be the Supreme
Court's frequently expressed concern to avoid loss to innocent parties
to the fullest extent possible. Indeed, the panel opinions voice
precisely this concern. But a school board may persuasively reply
that when distributing not a scarce resource but a common good-
when its assignments are made not to the most meritorious, or the
lowest bidder, or the most reliable company, but to all-that there
simply are no victims in the sense that understandably has troubled
federal courts in zero-sum-game contexts.
Was plaintiff Grace Tuttle disappointed when she was denied
attendance at the Arlington Traditional School? Was Jacob
Eisenberg frustrated when his application to a math and science
magnet first grade was unsuccessful? Of course they were. But every
autumn, hundreds of thousands of parents and their children are
similarly disappointed and frustrated when they learn that their
children have been assigned to public schools not of their hearts'
desire. Yearly adjustments to school attendance zones are made for a
wide variety of reasons, and boards dispatch children to new and
unfamiliar schools that cause apprehension and dissatisfaction to
parents and children alike. Neither federal nor state laws, however,
recognize the troubled parents or the fearful students as legal victims
273. 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976). In Davis, the Supreme Court held that "[a] statute,
otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the
basis 6f race." Id. at 241. For a school board repeatedly to readjust its assignment
policies, using racially neutral criteria, but with the admitted intent and objective of
achieving a desired racial balance, would appear to contravene the Davis principle.
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with rights to vindicate or losses that entitle them to seek
compensation. No principles of constitutional law or of education law
recognize a cognizable, vested liberty or property interest in attending
any particular elementary or secondary school. 74
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit implicitly concluded that
although a school board may deny a child admission to a magnet
school for an arbitrary reason ("we've just redrawn the school
boundary line two doors north of your house"), the board may not
deny the child admission for a racial reason. Such a conclusion,
however, does not honestly acknowledge school diversity as a
compelling end. Whether pursued by direct or by indirect means,
once school diversity is deemed a compelling end, some children must
necessarily be reassigned with race or ethnicity in mind if a school
board is permitted to achieve that end.
The Fourth Circuit's express disapproval of school boards' resort
to direct means of achieving student diversity and its implicit approval
of indirect means toward the same end does not distinguish
meaningfully between what is "narrower" and what is "broader." It is
irrational to suggest that, while school diversity (accidentally achieved
through non-racial assignment policies) is a compelling interest, a
school board must not adopt conscious means to achieve educational
diversity, at least until its judgment has been second-guessed by a
federal court 75
274. See generally LEROY J. PETERSON ET AL., THE LAW AND PUBLIC SCHOOL
OPERATION § 11.6, at 333-34 (1968) (stating that the school board is not required to
assign a child "to the nearest school or the school most conveniently located," nor will a
court "compel reassignment to the school selected by the parents"); 3 JAMEs A. RAPP,
EDUCATION LAW § 8.02[8], at 8-64 (1999) ("There is no constitutional right to a
particular placement. A student does not have a proprietary interest in where the student
receives an education. Students do not have a right to ... a particular school."); 1
WILLIAM D. VALENTE, EDUCATION LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE § 9.2, at 138-39 (1985)
("The discretion vested in local school boards to assign students to particular schools is
limited only by the rules against abuse of discretion and special circumstances .... Absent
constitutional compulsion or state legislation that mandates neighborhood school
assignments, students have no general right to be assigned to a neighborhood school.").
275. That suggestion actually appears to be the thrust of the Eisenberg panel's remarks
about "racial balancing." Those remarks raise interesting questions that I will not explore
here. If some racial diversity can be compelling, but racial balancing (creation of schools
that reflect the overall demographic variety of the school district) is forbidden, how much
diversity is it lawful for a school board to create? What would be an unacceptably low
degree of diversity, one which would justify school board reassignment? How much
reassignment would be too much, constitutionally speaking? Such dubious calculus is
reminiscent of the long-discredited position of a three-judge panel within the Fourth
Circuit that interpreted Brown not to require integration, but only minimal desegregation.
See Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (per curiam) (declaring that
"[t]he Constitution ... does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination.").
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IV. SCHOOL ASSIGNMENT ALTERNATIVES IN THE AFTERMATH OF
TUTTLE, EISENBERG, AND CAPA CCHIONE
This Article has contended that Tuttle, Eisenberg, and
Capaccione are neither fully faithful to Supreme Court precedent, nor
are they fully consistent with the logic of the modern affirmative
action cases such as Croson and Adarand on which they purport to
rely. Hence, one option appropriate for any school board is to wait
until after the Supreme Court has addressed these issues before
taking any steps at all.
Although the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in Tuttle and
Eisenberg,76 it must eventually address and resolve the two key
constitutional issues they present: (1) whether enhancing racial and
ethnic diversity in a public school's student population is a compelling
interest; and (2) if so, what means are sufficiently "narrowly tailored"
to meet that end.277
But see Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 200-01 n.11 (1973)
(noting that the Briggs view of Brown was necessarily repudiated by the Court's decision
in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430,437-38 (1968)).
276. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Eisenberg case on March 20,
2000, see Montgomery County Pub. Sch. v. Eisenberg, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000), and
dismissed the petition for certiorari in Tuttle on March 28, 2000, see Tuttle v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000), the Court has long cautioned the bar that its
decision not to grant certiorari can come for many reasons unrelated to the merits, and
that lawyers should never conclude from a denial of certiorari that the Court implicitly has
approved either the lower court's opinion or its judgment in the case under consideration.
See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 85 (1995) (noting that "[o]f course, '[t]he denial
of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the
bar has been told many times'" (quoting United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490
(1923))). See generally ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE § 5.7, at 239 (7th ed. 1993) (clarifying the limited significance of denials
of certiorari and citing the Court's precedents to support the point).
277. The Tuttle panel correctly noted that the diversity issue had not been resolved; it is
looming, however, in various cases that either have been recently decided or are currently
working their way through the federal circuits. See, e.g., Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061,1063 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding use of race and ethnicity as
compelling considerations in the selection of students for a research elementary school
associated with the UCLA's Graduate School of Education); Ho v. San Francisco Unified
Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1998) (remanding for a trial on whether the use
of race and ethnicity are still justified in overcoming vestiges of prior de facto
discrimination in San Francisco public schools, but expressing a narrow view of
permissible uses of race-conscious policies outside a remedial context); Wessmann v.
Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 796-809 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that Boston had not demonstrated
a compelling interest in using race to override its reliance upon competitive examination
scores to use race in assigning students to a merit school); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
951 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that race and ethnicity may not be considered in the
admissions process at the University of Texas Law School, because "non-remedial state
interests will never justify racial classifications"); Brewer v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch.
Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 620 (W.D.N.Y 1999) (granting a preliminary injunction to
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A. What These Cases Hold
The educational world is now divided into two parts. As
Capacchione demonstrates, school districts that currently operate
under a federal court's desegregation order continue to be subject to
Swann, Green, and the more recent case law of Dowell, Freeman, and
Jenkins IlL Alternatively, school districts in the Fourth Circuit not
under desegregation decrees must accommodate themselves to the
brave new world of Tuttle and Eisenberg.
1. School Districts Currently Under Desegregation Orders
Districts operating under desegregation orders were authorized
long ago to make race-conscious student assignments in furtherance
of their "affirmative duty" to end racially-dual school systems.
School boards may, indeed must, follow whatever race-conscious
remedies were authorized by earlier federal decrees until their
districts have been declared unitary and released from federal
supervision.
If no party objects to a school board's race-conscious current
practices, the board has no affirmative obligation to alter the status
quo. If the board decides, however, that it wishes to have its district
declared unitary, it must come forward with a motion for relief, and it
must be prepared to prove that it can satisfy the three Freeman
factors: (1) that the school board has "full[y] and satisfactor[ily]
compli[ed] with the decree," (2) that "the vestiges of past
discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable," and
(3) that "the school district has demonstrated ... its good-faith
commitment to the whole of the court's decree and to those
provisions of the law and Constitution that were the predicate for
parents of white city school student who alleged that school board's use of race to exclude
their daughter from participation in a two-way transfer program--only minority-race
students could transfer from city schools to suburban schools, and only non-minority-race
students could transfer from suburban schools to city schools-violated the Equal
Protection Clause), vacated and remanded, 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000); Martin v. School
Dist. of Philadelphia., No. 95-5650, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13861, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(distinguishing between "race-conscious" and "race preferential" programs and holding
that the goal of "ensuring equal educational opportunities across racial lines" is a
compelling interest that will justify employing a 65% to 35% black to white ratio in
implementing a student transfer policy); Jacobs v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 625, No. 99-
CV-542 (D. Minn. filed Apr. 6, 1999) (challenging the use of race in assignment to St. Paul
magnet schools); Scott v Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV99-1328 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan.
22, 1999) (challenging a student assignment policy that considers race, color, national
origin, ethnicity, and gender); Cowan v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., No. 2:97-2493-08
(D.S.C. filed Aug. 20, 1997) (challenging the use of race in student assignments to magnet
schools).
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judicial intervention in the first instance.""8
Districts that have resisted a judicial decree for a period of time,
subsequently departed from the decree's terms without court
approval, or tolerated schools whose student or faculty populations
remain racially identifiable under any of the six Green factors-
student assignments, faculty assignments, staff assignments,
transportation, extra-curricular activities, or school facilities-may
well have difficulty shouldering their burden of proof and receiving
unitary status. As Dowell, Freeman, Jenkins 111, and Capacchione all
illustrate, however, modem federal courts are increasingly concerned
about ending court-supervised desegregation decrees and returning
school districts to local control. No plaintiff can be sure that a school
district's failure to comply fully with a desegregation decree, to
eliminate all vestiges of segregation, or to have acted in good faith in
its post-decree conduct will assure continuing federal supervision or
continuing justification for race-conscious remedies.279
278. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 89; see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491-93 (1992)
(setting forth this standard).
279. On the other hand, a number of federal courts have denied unitary status to
petitioning school boards in recent years, retaining court-ordered jurisdiction pending
further judicial review because of perceived failures to end vestiges to the extent
practicable. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 216 F.3d 720, 727 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(reversing a district court judgment that granted unitary status in long-running Kansas
City, Missouri school desegregation suit, and remanding for an evidentiary hearing on
whether the school district had taken sufficient steps both to implement student
achievement goals and to eliminate an achievement gap between white and black students
in the district); United States v. Georgia, 171 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999) (reversing a
district court judgment that granted unitary status to the Troup County, Georgia school
district in erroneous reliance upon a 1973 court order, and remanding for further
proceedings); Liddell v. Special Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 862, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming
the district court's finding that the school system has not achieved full unitary status
because it had failed to act in good faith in desegregating the city's vocational education
facilities); Morgan v. Burke, 926 F.2d 86, 89 (1st Cir. 1991) (affirming the district court's
denial of unitary status because of inequities in assigning black faculty and administrative
staff); Lee v. Autauga County Bd. of Educ., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1203 (M.D. Ala. 1999)
(noting that the school board was still bound by a 1997 consent decree finding that it has
achieved unitary status with respect to transportation, physical facilities, discipline, equity
in salary but that it had not achieved unitary status in the areas of faculty, staff,
curriculum, majority-to-minority transfers, and student achievement); Manning v. School
Bd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (concluding that despite the general
obligation for federal courts to restore local control to school boards promptly, "there is
more work to be done" in desegregating the Hillsborough County district, and thus
judicial "supervision remains necessary"); Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 960 F. Supp.
96, 101 (W.D. La. 1997) (holding that the school district had not yet attained unitary status
because it still had racially identifiable schools in three wards within the district), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 145 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 1998); Stanley v. Darlington
County Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp. 1341, 1414-15 (D.S.C. 1995) (denying unitary status
because the school system still had racially identifiable schools, faculty assignment
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The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district offers a prime
example of the federal courts' more lenient, post-Freeman
disposition. In the early 1990s, the board unilaterally departed from a
court-ordered assignment plan in favor of greater reliance on magnet
schools and other more flexible assignment devices. Moreover, the
Swann plaintiffs identified a number of Green areas in which
continuing vestiges of former segregation could be discerned. Indeed,
the school board agreed with the plaintiffs' criticisms and offered to
implement a new "controlled choice" plan to achieve greater student
desegregation. The district court nonetheless declared the district
unitary, dissolved the former decree, and ended federal supervision.
2. School Districts Not Currently Under Desegregation Orders
The principal legal changes forecast by Tuttle, Eisenberg, and
Capacchione involve schools that have never operated under a
desegregation order (such as the defendant school board in
Eisenberg), as well as those declared unitary and released from
judicial supervision.
a. The Specific Practices Condemned by Tuttle
As we have seen, the Tuttle panel held that the deliberate use of
race or ethnicity in making school assignments is not sufficiently
narrowly tailored to survive "strict judicial scrutiny" under the Equal
Protection Clause.20 The Tuttle court did look with apparent favor
on three alternative means of achieving student diversity that had
been identified by an Arlington schools admission study committee-
all of which it expressly designated as "race-neutral policies.'281
Under the first alternative, the board could "assign a small
geographic area ... as the home school [sic] for that [geographic]
area, and fill the remaining spaces ... by means of an unweighted
procedures, and busing plans that were too burdensome on the black community), rev'd
on other grounds, 84 F.3d. 707,717 (4th Cir. 1996).
280. The policy's flaw, according to the court, was its "reli[ance] upon [nonremedial]
racial balancing." Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board, 195 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir.
1999), cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000). The panel rejected the Arlington school
board's distinction that this policy was different from others previously held
unconstitutional because, under this policy, no particular percentage was reserved solely
for minority group members. See id. at 707. The panel explained: "Although the Policy
does not explicitly set aside spots solely for certain minorities, it has practically the same
result by skewing the odds of selection in favor of certain minorities. Even if the final
results may have some statistical variation, what drives the entire weighted lottery process
... is racial balancing." Id.
281. See id. at 706 & n.11.
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random lottery from a ... geographic area [that] would presumably
be selected so that its residents would positively effect the diversity of
the school." Under the second alternative, the board would put the
names of every child in the district into a lottery and offer all those
randomly selected the opportunity to enter a second lottery
comprised of those who would like to attend the particular magnet
school. Under this version, no one could initially apply for the school;
only those randomly selected would be invited to participate in the
selection lottery. Under the third alternative, "[e]ach neighborhood
school ... [would receive] a certain number of slots at each
alternative school," presumably so it could place some of its own
students at the alternative school.m
Both the first and the third alternatives rest on the unexamined
(but doubtless largely accurate) assumption that different racial and
ethnic groups are likely to live in separate neighborhoods-i.e., to
experience racial residential segregation-and that therefore, "race-
neutral" lotteries that select students from different residential
neighborhoods will, in fact, increase student diversity. The panel's
approving citation of these alternative measures suggests that a high
degree of race-conscious behavior by school districts may be
acceptable. Boards apparently may recognize and act in the
knowledge of the realities of residential segregation within their
district as they fashion school assignments, so long as they act through
the medium of neighborhoods and not through the media of
individual students and their families.
Some might wonder how intentionally structuring student
assignment zones to achieve racial diversity can survive scrutiny
under Supreme Court precedents which provide that "[a] statute,
otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of race." As suggested in Part III, this
apparent inconsistency reflects the panel's underlying confusion
about the relationship between student diversity as a compelling state
end and the use of racial criteria as a narrowly tailored means."6 As I
noted earlier, if it is legitimate, even compelling, for school boards to
seek racial and ethnic diversity as an educational end, it is puzzling
why assigning by race directly is not an acceptable means, but why
282. Id at 706 n.11.
283. Id.
284. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (applying the Davis rule); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
285. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241.
286. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
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doing so indirectly, though no less deliberately, in reliance upon the
racial identity of a segregated neighborhood, is an acceptable means.
One plausible constitutional answer is that a school board's
reliance upon the racial composition of neighborhoods does not
foreclose a determined parent of any race from making a private
choice to leave a segregated neighborhood and go elsewhere. If
school authorities do not expressly use race to choose a student's
school assignment, parents retain some freedom to avoid unwanted
school assignments and the chance to secure special school
placements by altering their place of residence-provided they have
the financial means and the determination to do so. Viewed from an
individual perspective, this approach involves slightly less coercion by
state officials; although officials may take the predominant racial
characteristics of neighborhoods into account, parents can act within
the private sphere to avoid any public assignment based upon their
own race or ethnic origin.
b. The Specific Practices Condemned by Eisenberg
In Eisenberg, the specific practice under scrutiny was the
district's use of race in evaluating student requests to transfer to a
school other than the one to which the child was initially assigned.
2 7
Students were normally permitted to transfer to schools where their
own racial percentages were underrepresented, unless their departure
would adversely affect the racial composition of their transferring
school. Conversely, students were normally denied a transfer to
schools where their own racial percentages were already
overrepresented. Indeed, the Montgomery school board admitted
that it normally denied transfer requests solely on the basis of race
whenever a transfer would contribute to racial isolation.288
The Fourth Circuit condemned this practice as "mere racial
balancing in a pure form," and, quoting Tuttle, held that "'[s]uch
nonremedial racial balancing is unconstitutional.' "9 The Eisenberg
panel continued: "Added to the racial balancing is the fact that [the
student's] transfer request was refused because of his race. As we
have pointed out, such race based governmental actions are presumed
to be invalid and are subject to strict scrutiny." '2 9 Hence, Eisenberg
287. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 124 (4th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000).
288. See id. at 133.
289. Id. at 131 (quoting Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698,705 (4th Cir.
1999).
290. Id at 133.
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appears to condemn school boards' consideration of race in passing
upon individual student transfer requests as well as more general
school board efforts to achieve proportionate racial populations in
each school.
In sum, Tuttle and Eisenberg invalidated non-remedial uses of
race as a consideration-even one among several-in selecting
students for magnet schools, and in approving or disapproving
student transfer requests. The panels indicated that it made no
constitutional difference whether only black students (or other
minority students) or both black and white students were subject to
the same sort of policy considerations (in other words, whether the
policy embraces racial preferences or instead was "merely" race-
conscious).
c. Unresolved Questions
Many questions remain unresolved by the Fourth Circuit's recent
decisions. Do these cases forbid all "majority to minority" ("M-to-
M") transfer programs, under which school boards normally honor
voluntary student requests to transfer if the student seeks a school in
which his or her race is in the minority? M-to-M programs differ
from the one under consideration in Montgomery County by their
absence of any specific racial or ethnic goals or quotas, such as the
maintenance of a student population within fifteen percent of the
countywide average. In that way, M-to-M programs avoid the "racial
balancing," which Tuttle and Eisenberg treated as almost per se
unconstitutional.
The prospects for M-to-M programs, however, seem uncertain
for two reasons, even though they are not full-fledged racial balancing
programs. First, such programs implicitly depend upon some overall
quota or balance, since transfers will not be honored if a student's
race is identical to that of a majority of the students in the receiving
school. Second, M-to-M programs are subject to the same general
criticism that the Eisenberg panel leveled against the Montgomery
County policy, because students "are all subject to being denied a
transfer request solely on the basis of their race." 91 To borrow the
language of Tuttle, any applicants who are denied a transfer on racial
grounds might be viewed as "innocent third parties."219
Another unresolved question is whether these cases forbid the
consideration of race and ethnicity in drawing or readjusting school
291. Id. at 129.
292. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 707.
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attendance zones. The Tuttle court, as noted above, cited with
apparent approval three alternative race-neutral school assignment
policies that used various constellations of neighborhood and district-
wide feeder zones to create schools with diverse student
populations.29 3 Several of these alternatives could only work to create
diversity if school boards are permitted to take into consideration the
racial and ethnic composition of the neighborhoods selected for
inclusion. Yet it seems implausible to imagine the current Fourth
Circuit approving the deliberate "pairing and clustering" of non-
contiguous neighborhoods-a practice specifically approved in
Swann294 -if the only criterion for designation of the neighborhoods
is race.
One source of insight into what is constitutionally permissible
may come from the voting rights arena. The Supreme Court
acknowledged in Shaw v. Huni2 95 that "[a]pplying traditional equal
protection principles in the voting-rights context is 'a most delicate
task,' ... because a legislature may be conscious of the voters' races
without using race as a basis for assigning voters to districts. 296
Although Equal Protection Clause challenges to such legislative
decisions are ongoing,297 the most recent and pertinent authority
provides that "[t]he constitutional wrong occurs when race becomes
the 'dominant and controlling' consideration.""29 School boards can
use Shaw to insist that they may draw school attendance zones with
the knowledge of their racial implications so long as race or ethnicity
is not the "dominant and controlling consideration. 299
293. See id. at 706 n.11.
294. See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1971).
295. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
296. Id at 905 (internal citation omitted).
297. See id.; see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 120 S. Ct. 2715 (2000) (noting probable
jurisdiction to resolve Equal Protection Clause challenge to North Carolina's revised
redistricting plan); Bush v Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 962 (1996) (applying strict scrutiny in
examining Texas's 1990 redistricting plan); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995)
(applying strict scrutiny in examining Georgia's 1990 redistricting plan); United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995) (denying standing to plaintiffs who sought strict scrutiny of
Louisiana's 1990 redistricting plan); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (applying
strict scrutiny in examining North Carolina's 1990 redistricting plan).
298. Shaw, 517 U.S. at 905 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 905).
299. Id. See generally Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D.
Mass. 1999) (denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against the Boston
School Committee's use of race in creating school attendance zones, reasoning that the
record was insufficient to determine whether the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the
merits). But see Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 98 F. Supp. 2d 111, 112-14 (D.
Mass. 2000) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' allegations that the Boston
School Committee's creation of school attendance zones, based in part on racial
considerations, violates the Fourteenth Amendment and other federal and state laws).
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Another race-related question unaddressed by Tuttle and
Eisenberg is whether schools may design special programs to assist
students of certain races who are having academic difficulties and
then assign students to those programs. If a school board has reliable
educational data suggesting, for example, that African-American
males are experiencing special problems in mathematics, or that
Latina females are having difficulty with science, can the board take
direct action to address those problems? The answer is unclear. It is
certain, however, that to use racial or ethnic classifications, even for
educational purposes, a board's policy will need to survive strict
judicial scrutiny. In other words, the board must both identify a
compelling end and show that its means are narrowly tailored. Most
probably, achieving academic success for all children would be
accepted as a compelling governmental end. Both Tuttle and
Eisenberg strongly suggested, however, that when non-racial means to
achieve such an end are available, they should be tried first. Hence, it
may well be incumbent upon school boards to open the admission for
such programs to students of all racial and ethnic backgrounds who
may be experiencing whatever particular academic difficulties the
special programs seek to address.
A recent Ninth Circuit opinion, Hunter v. Regents of the
University of California,300 provides some support for the proposition
that it is legally permissible to address educational challenges that
have a special racial or ethnic dimension. In Hunter, a panel, over a
strong dissent, upheld a university policy authorizing the use of race
and ethnicity in selecting children to attend a public elementary
school connected with the University of California at Los Angeles
(UCLA) Graduate School of Education. The district court reasoned
that the very purpose of the research-oriented graduate school was to
address and find educational solutions for the special challenges
presented by the "[c]ultural and economic differences" that
California's multi-ethnic students bring to California classrooms.3 0'
The UCLA policy assured that its research school would reflect the
state's demographic makeup, an interest the panel found
"compelling" under those circumstances. 302 The case is potentially
distinguishable from that of most elementary and secondary schools,
of course, because the panel placed emphasis on the experimental
and research dimensions of the UCLA program. Yet one purpose of
300. 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999).




the UCLA study is to discern whether racially or ethnically tailored
academic programs might better serve the educational needs of
particular groups of California's children. If UCLA succeeds in
fashioning such programs, surely their use would also be compelling.
There would be little point in allowing schools of education to
conduct research if their race-specific educational findings are barred
from use in the public schools despite their promise of educational
benefits.
Finally, nothing in Tutle and Eisenberg purports to forbid state
or local school authorities from continuing to collect data on racial or
ethnic issues. Indeed, federal and state statutes require such data.
The Fourth Circuit's principal constitutional concern appears to have
been with government treatment of citizens on racial grounds;
governmental collection of data does not imply any subsequent
difference in treatment, and therefore, it should not be threatened by
these recent decisions.
Tuttle and Eisenberg also have likely significance for other race-
conscious decision-making by state or local school boards-respecting
teacher assignments, staff assignments, and use of curricula, among
others. Although this Article confines its analysis to the impact of
these cases on student assignment policy, the doctrinal implications of
the cases plainly extend further. I will not explore those additional
implications except to make the following generalization: The Fourth
Circuit is committed to strict judicial scrutiny whenever a plaintiff
asserts a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause to state
classifications that depend upon race or ethnicity. Under strict
scrutiny, federal courts within the Fourth Circuit are likely to demand
that any future race-conscious faculty or staff assignments meet some
compelling governmental end and are narrowly tailored to further
that end. Judicial examination of justifications for race-conscious
hiring, assignment, promotion, and layoff policies has a two-decade
history in the federal courts 03 implicating not only constitutional
concerns but also issues arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.30
303. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986)
(invalidating a collective bargaining agreement under which African-Americans were
given protection against layoffs beyond those occasioned by their individual seniority);
Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996) (using Title VII to invalidate
a school board's decision to discharge a white teacher rather than a black teacher as part
of a faculty-downsizing, which the school board had justified by its interest in promoting a
racially diverse teacher corps).
304. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
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B. Other Courses of Action Open to School Boards
One of the most interesting responses to Tuttle and Eisenberg has
occurred in Wake County, North Carolina. There the school board
has voted to end its traditional approach of balancing elementary and
secondary schools along racial lines in favor of a new approach, under
which it will weigh both family income and student academic
performance in making assignments. 5 Under this new plan, students
will be assigned with the twin objectives: (1) that no school will have
a student population more than forty percent of which is eligible for
free or reduced-price lunches (a widely used measure of parents'
economic status), and (2) that no school will have a student
population more than twenty-five percent of which read below grade
level.3"6 The board estimated that nineteen of its seventy-four
elementary schools and three of its twenty-two middle schools
presently fall outside one or both of these criteria, and therefore are
subject to student assignment shifts.3 7
This new policy likely will achieve significant racial integration
because of the disproportionately high percentage of African-
American children who reside in low-income families or who perform
relatively poorly on state standardized tests.308 Nonetheless
[a]bout 38 percent of Wake [county's] minority students will
no longer be automatically targeted for integration ...
because they passed the state's year-end reading exams and
their families earn enough money so that they are not
eligible for free or reduced-price lunches. And about 13
percent of the district's white students, those who either
read below grade level or qualify for subsidized lunches, will
be among those who could be reassigned to help the schools
meet their new, colorblind definition of diversity.0 9
The plan will not "zero in on individual students by reassigning
only those who fit the new criteria while leaving others in the
neighborhood alone. '310 Instead, the new plan typically will transfer
all students in neighborhoods where most of the students are poor or
are reading below grade level. Hence some children in those affected
neighborhoods will be reassigned even if they have solid reading skills
305. See Silberman, supra note 18, at 1A.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See Tim Simmons, School Plan Signals New Chapter in Integration, NEWS &
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and are not from poor families.31'
This approach appears to be a fully constitutional alternative
means to achieve diversity. Neither socioeconomic status nor
academic skills are "inherently suspect" classifications that normally
prompt strict judicial scrutiny.312 Instead, both are solidly related to a
district's overall educational concerns. Individual student
performances are obviously germane to such concerns, and reliable
academic research has also correlated low socioeconomic status with
low educational performance.313 More recently, research has shown
that large increases in a school's percentage of low-income children is
associated with lower academic performances among all children
within the school. In other words, very high percentages of poor
children within a school tend to depress the learning of all students
who attend these schools, irrespective of their individual economic
backgrounds.314
Consequently, school assignments based upon educational and
socioeconomic criteria seem rationally related, at a minimum, to the
legitimate end of furthering students' academic progress. Such
assignment policies should easily pass rational basis judicial scrutiny,
so long as school boards make good faith efforts to assure a court that
they are acting for legitimate educational concerns and not simply to
311. See id.
312. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (holding
that wealth discrimination alone does not require strict scrutiny review); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971) (holding that strict scrutiny is not required when a law
singles out housing tenants on the basis of their low incomes).
313. See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
299-302 (1966) (documenting relationships between family socioeconomic status and
individual educational performance); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A
REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (1972)
(same); ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (Frederick Mosteller & Daniel
P. Moynihan eds., 1972) (same).
314. See MARY M. KENNEDY ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, POVERTY,
ACHIEVEMENT AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMPENSATORY EDUCATION SERVICES 20-
22 (1986) (documenting the relationship between high levels of school poverty and lower
average school achievement); LAURA LIPPMAN ET AL., URBAN SCHOOLS: THE
CHALLENGE OF LOCATION AND POVERTY x-xii (1996) (reporting that both urban
location and high school poverty concentration were associated with lower academic
performance); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, PROSPECTS: FINAL
REPORT ON STUDENT OUTCOMES v, 73 (1997) (reporting extensive research revealing
that "school poverty concentration is associated with lower academic performance");
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, SCHOOL POVERTY AND ACADEMIC
PERFORMANCE: NAEP ACHIEVEMENT IN HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS 3-5 (1998) (noting
the relationship between high percentages of lower-income children within schools and
the lower average academic performance by children in those schools on mathematics and
reading achievement tests administered by the National Assessment of Educational
Progress).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
re-impose racial assignment patterns through a subterfuge. The
Wake County board appears to be charting a defensible course that
other school districts would be wise to examine.15
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit has predicted that if school boards are
permitted to engage in race-conscious school assignments, school
children might somehow learn from these educational choices to view
their classmates solely in racial terms and not as individuals. Allow
me a contrary prediction. It is far more likely that if willing school
boards cannot assign students by race or ethnicity, we risk a rapid
return to a time when each school child could, and did, identify
"white schools" and "black schools" simply by reference to the
predominant race of the children attending them. Far more certainly
than school boards' good-faith efforts to assure of educational
diversity, this de facto resegregation of our schools will re-create the
conditions condemned in Brown in 1954.316
I grew up in such a time. It worked a terrible evil. Although I
cannot speak for my African-American neighbors, since segregation
foreclosed my opportunity ever to know them, it was a
psychologically damaging and educationally destructive experience
for my white friends and myself and, I venture, for millions of other
children. It has taken literally decades for my generation to begin to
shed the unconscious, but pernicious, grip of the segregated
environments in which we were brought up, with all of the fears,
suspicions, and misunderstanding that they created.317 It has also
315. See generally Bower, supra note 18, at 2038 (asserting that "Wake County's
decision to replace explicit considerations of race with race-neutral alternatives allows the
plan to avoid the constitutional infirmity identified in Capacchione, Tuttle, and
Eisenberg").
316. Chief Judge Wilkinson has acknowledged the crucial role served by public schools
in fostering a multiracial society:
The values of Brown are most poignantly implicated [in education], because
society has traditionally relied upon public schools to lay the bedrock for
integration. Elementary and secondary schools were not only designed to
prepare students for the challenges and opportunities of American life; they
were also meant to serve as melting pots where interracial friendship could
counteract prejudice at an early age. Separatist educational arrangements
threaten both of these traditional goals.
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in
Multicultural America, 47 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1018-19 (1995) (footnote omitted).
317. See generally WILLIE MORRIS, YAZOO: INTEGRATION IN A DEEP SOUTHERN
TOWvN 27 (1971) (expressing the hope that "[tihis generation of children, white and black,
in Yazoo will not, I sense, be so isolated as mine, for they will be confronted quite early
with the things it took me years to learn, or that I have not learned at all").
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taken decades of extraordinary dedication by the generation who
dismantled that twisted system-black and white, lawyers and lay
people, school principals, teachers, activists and simple, decent
parents-all of whom fought, many at great sacrifice, to overcome
centuries of enforced segregation and to replace it with something
finer, something truer to the deepest promises of the American
system?18
It is more than a mistake-it is a tragedy-when with so little
genuine debate, with such an absence of serious reflection upon
either the profound costs or the dubious benefits of their decision,
federal courts, in the name of abstract "colorblindness," now enjoin
school boards from bringing together school children across the
stubborn remnants of our national color line. This substitution of
federal judicial will for the judgment of local public officials, who are
daily responsible for the education of our children in cities and towns
throughout the Fourth Circuit, will, I fear, do grave and permanent
damage to the sensibilities and social development of a whole new
generation of American students.
I can find no more apt words with which to close than those
written in 1896 by the first Justice Harlan: "The destinies of the two
races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and the
interest of both require that the common government of all shall not
permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of
law. '319 Though more than two races share our national life in the
year 2000, their destinies are no less "indissolubly linked together"
than when Justice Harlan penned his famous dissent. While the
believers in the new racial piety cite Justice Harlan's declaration from
this selfsame dissent that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind" 320 in
support of their faith, Justice Harlan would neither have recognized
nor approved the use to which they have put his admonition. Justice
Harlan's deepest concern, as he made clear, was to resist government
action that would "create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between
318. Chief Justice Wilkinson has assured readers that today's federal judges "are aware
of the extraordinary role their predecessors played in promoting a unified view of
American citizenship," and appreciate the "small acts of personal courage and
perseverance on the order of that found at Valley Forge" that characterized the struggles
of black people "toward the integrative ideal." Wilkinson, supra note 316, at 996. The
ultimate resolution of the underlying issues in Tuttle, Eisenberg, and Capacchione will
surely test the devotion of present judges to the vision and courage of their extraordinary
predecessors.
319. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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these races,""32 that would permit "[t]he arbitrary separation of
citizens, on the basis of race."'" Under the conditions prevailing in
Arlington County, Virginia, Montgomery County, Maryland, and
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, in the year 2000, it is the three
decisions recently rendered within the Fourth Circuit that most
clearly invite the "arbitrary separation" and most certainly risk the
"distrust between the races" that John Marshall Harlan wrote to
lament and condemn a century ago.
321. Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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